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BANKRUPTCY & CREDITORS' RIGHTS
Roger S. Cox*
HIS topic has been revised somewhat from previous years to empha-
size recent developments in bankruptcy and to de-emphasize some-
what caselaw development under the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act t (FIRREA) and D'Oench Duhme.2 This
article addresses recent development of the application of the federal six-year
statutes of limitations; however, FIRREA is covered more extensively in the
article on banking law and in other areas of this issue.
Although there is a greater emphasis on developments in bankruptcy law,
this article is not intended as an exhaustive survey of all bankruptcy-related
caselaw developments in Texas and the Fifth Circuit. Rather, the author
has attempted to emphasize those cases that may be of interest to the Texas
practitioner or otherwise involve application of Texas law or implementation
of Fifth Circuit precedent previously reported in earlier Survey issues.
In the areas of creditors rights and consumer credit, this article addresses
cases dealing with such issues as wrongful foreclosure and statutory changes
regarding computation of notice periods in real property foreclosure.
The article reviews statutory developments of interest in the above areas.
Emphasis is given to the 73rd term of the Texas Legislature, which ad-
journed in May of 1993. Additional developments in the United States Con-
gress were pending as the Survey period expired.3
I. BANKRUPTCY
A. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
During the Survey period, the United States Supreme Court issued only
four opinions that directly addressed bankruptcy issues, three of which are
reported here. Coincidentally, the first two cases both deal with treatment of
residential mortgages in Chapter 13. The third case addresses bar dates and
late filed proofs of claim.
* B.S., Southwest Texas State University; J.D., St. Mary's University School of Law;
Partner, Ham, Irwin & Cox, L.L.P., Amarillo, Texas.
The author gratefully acknowledges the contribution of Mari Daniel, Legal Assistant, Ham,
Irwin & Cox, L.L.P., for her able assistance in the preparation of the manuscript.
1. The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L.
No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989).
2. D'Oench Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
3. The Survey period runs from October 1, 1992 through September 30, 1993.
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1. Chapter 13 - Home Mortgages
The Supreme Court, in Nobleman v. American Savings Bank,4 held that a
Chapter 13 debtor could not reduce an undersecured homestead mortgage to
the fair market value of a mortgaged residence. In Nobleman the Chapter 13
debtors' modified plan valued their residence at $23,500.00, which was un-
controverted, and proposed mortgage payments up to that amount plus pre-
petition arrearages only.5 According to the lender's proof of claim, the full
amount of principal, interest, and fees claimed was $71,335.00.6
The debtors, relying on Section 506 of the Bankruptcy Code, sought to
treat the remainder of the bank's claim as unsecured. 7 The mortgagee and
the Chapter 13 trustee both objected to the modified plan, arguing that bifur-
cation of the bank's claim into a secured claim and an unsecured claim mod-
ified the bank's rights as a mortgagee of a debtor's principal residence, which
violated Section 1322(b).8
In affirming the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,9 the Supreme
Court held that to give effect to Section 506(a)'s valuation and bifurcation
for a Chapter 13 plan would require a modification of the rights of the
holder of the secured claim. Again, this would have violated Section
1322(b)(2), 10 which allows modification of the rights of both secured and
unsecured creditors, subject to special protection for creditors whose claims
are secured only by a lien on the debtor's principal residence. "
Although not key to the court's analysis, Nobleman was a practical exten-
sion of the court's earlier holding in Dewsnup v. Timm.12 In Dewsnup the
court found that a Chapter 7 debtor could not "strip" property of a lien to
4. 113 S. Ct. 2106 (1993).
5. Id. at 2108.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 2108-09. Section 506(a) provides in part:
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate
has an interest ... is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's
interest in the estate's interest in such property ... and is an unsecured claim to
the extent that the value of such creditor's interest ... is less than the amount of
such allowed claim.
Id. at 2109 n.l (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988)).
8. Id. at 2109; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988).
9. See Nobleman v. American Sav. Bank (In re Nobleman), 968 F.2d 483 (5th Cir.
1992). See generally Cynthia J. Rerko & Sander L. Esserman, Creditor and Consumer Rights,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 46 SMU L. REV. 1187, 1192-93 (1993) (discussing Fifth Circuit
opinion).
10. Nobleman, 113 S. Ct. at 2111. The Court held that the "rights" bargained for by the
mortgagor and the mortgagee included those protected from modification by § 1322(b)(2) of
the Code. Id. at 2110; see also Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 778 (1992). The Court also
noted that the mortgagee's rights were not completely unaffected by the Chapter 13 bank-
ruptcy. For instance, the mortgagee was subject to the automatic stay. See 11 U.S.C. § 362
(1988); United Sav. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forrest Assoc., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 369-70
(1988). Moreover, the debtor could have cured pre-petition defaults on their home mortgage
by paying off the arrearages over the life of the plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (1988).
11. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) provides that a Chapter 13 plan may "modify the rights of
holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a security interest in real property
that is the debtor's principal residence, or of holders of unsecured claims or leave unaffected the
rights of holders of any class of claims." 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988) (emphasis added).
12. 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992).
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the extent the amount of the underlying indebtedness exceeded the value of
the property. 13 Because the net effect on the respective debtors was the
same, it is tempting to view Nobleman as simply another limitation on a
debtor's right to bifurcate a secured and unsecured claim. The reader is
cautioned, however, to note that the Nobleman court was dealing with a
specific statute. The particular statute was Section 1322(b)(2) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, which deals with a specific type of claim: a claim secured by a
debtor's principal residence in the context of a Chapter 13 proceeding. No-
where in Dewsnup or Nobleman is there any indication that these cases have
any direct impact on reorganizations under Chapters 11 or 12 (or for that
matter, Chapter 13 debts secured by property other than the debtor's princi-
pal residence). Moreover, the Nobleman court acknowledged that the debt-
ors were correct in looking to Section 506(a) for a judicial valuation of the
collateral to determine the status of the bank's secured claim. As the court
noted, however, such a determination "does not necessarily mean that the
rights the bank enjoys as a mortgagee, which are protected by § 1322(b)(2),
are limited by the valuation of its secured claim."' 14
In Rake v. Wade,15 another Chapter 13 case, the Supreme Court held that
an oversecured creditor was entitled to pre-confirmation and post-confirma-
tion interest on home mortgage arrearages paid off under the debtor's Chap-
ter 13 plans. In Rake two pairs of debtors initiated separate Chapter 13
proceedings. Those debtors, together with another married couple, were in
arrears on long-term promissory notes held by Wade and secured by the
debtors' home mortgages. Those mortgages did not provide for interest on
arrearages. The value of the residence owned by each pair of debtors ex-
ceeded the respective notes' outstanding balance, making Wade an over-
secured creditor. In their Chapter 13 plans, the debtors proposed to make
all future payments due on the notes and to pay off arrearages without
interest.
The court disregarded the debtors' interpretation of Sections 506(b) and
1322(b)(5). The court specifically held that under Section 506(b), the holder
of an oversecured claim is allowed interest on its claim to the extent of the
value of the collateral. 16 In other words, post-petition interest must be paid
on all oversecured claims. 17 Turning to Section 1325(a), the debtors asserted
that the subsection of that statute directing payment of the "present value"
of a secured creditor's claim applies only to secured claims modified in the
Chapter 13 plan, which, by reason of Section 1323(b)(2), does not include
home mortgages. ' 8 Relying on the plain language of the Code, however, the
court held that the secured creditor was entitled to post-confirmation inter-
13. Id. at 778. Dewsnup was reported during last year's Survey period. See Rerko &
Esserman, supra note 9, at 1191-92.
14. Nobleman, 113 S. Ct. at 2110.
15. 113 S. Ct. 2187, 2193 (1993).
16. Id. at 2191.
17. Id. at 2188 (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 245 (1989)).
18. Rake, 113 S. Ct. at 2192.
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est on the mortgage arrearages.19
2. Bar Dates; Excusable Neglect
In Pioneer Investment Services, Co. v. Brunswick Associates, Ltd.20 a
number of secured creditors sought leave to file proofs of claim after the bar
date that had been included in a notice for meeting of creditors. The credi-
tors sought leave under Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)(1), which allows a court to
permit late filings that result from excusable neglect. 2' The creditors' coun-
sel had assured the creditors that there was not a bar date.
The Supreme Court held that the lawyer's inadvertent failure to file the
proofs of claim could constitute "excusable neglect" under the Bankruptcy
Rules, even if the neglect was not caused by intervening circumstances be-
yond the parties' control. 22 The Court added that the proper focus requires
taking into account all relevant circumstances, including the danger of preju-
dice to the debtor, the length of the delay, potential impact on judicial pro-
ceedings, reasons for the delay, and whether the creditor acted in good
faith. 23 Importantly, the Court noted that a party may be held accountable
for its lawyer's acts and omissions, so the focus would be not only on the
creditor but their counsel as well.24 Based on the Court's review of the cir-
cumstances, the Court found excusable neglect and allowed the late filing of
the claims, based in part on the fact that the debtor's second amended plan
of reorganization took into account claims of the moving creditors.
Significantly, the Court also noted that a bar date should be prominently
announced and accompanied by an explanation of its significance, criticizing
the court's "peculiar and inconspicuous placement of the bar date in a notice
regarding a creditors['] meeting."'25
3. Miscellaneous
As Judge Leif Clark has noted, the Supreme Court declined to consider a
number of cases that are of importance to the bankruptcy practitioner. 26
For instance, the Court denied certiorari in at least two cases that addressed
19. Id. at 2193-94.
20. 113 S. Ct. 1489 (1993).
21. Id. at 1491-93; see also FED. R. BANKR. PROC. 9006(b)(1). Rule 3003(c) provides that
a court shall fix and for cause shown may extend the time within which proofs of claim or
interest may be filed in a Chapter 11 case. Id. 3003(c)(3).
22. Pioneer Inv. Servs., Co., 113 S. Ct. at 1496-98 (1993) (discussing analogous procedural
rules dealing with excusable neglect, describing excusable neglect as "a somewhat elastic con-
cept ... not limited strictly to omissions caused by circumstances beyond the control of the
movant").
23. Id. at 1498 (citing the opinion of the Court of Appeals); see Brunswick Assocs. Ltd.
Partnership v. Pioneer Inv. Servs., Co. (In re Pioneer Inv. Servs., Co.), 943 F.2d 673, 677 (6th
Cir. 1991).
24. Pioneer Inv. Servs., Co., 113 S. Ct. at 1498-99; see also United States v. Boyle, 469
U.S. 241 (1985) (finding that a party can be penalized for counsel's tardy filing of tax return);
Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633 (1962) (upholding dismissal of lawsuit because of
attorney's failure to attend pre-trial conference).
25. Pioneer in. Servs., Co., 113 S. Ct. at 1499-1500.
26. See Honorable Leif M. Clark, Supreme Court Update, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS PROF.
DEV. PROGRAM, ADVANCED CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY COURSE (1993).
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the issue of new value and classification of creditor classes, including the
Fifth Circuit case of In re Greystone III Joint Venture.27 Other issues ad-
dressed by the Fifth Circuit in which the Supreme Court denied certiorari
include the following: (i) how the rate of interest payable to an oversecured
creditor should be determined; 28 (ii) whether the automatic stay prevents ad
valorem taxes from becoming perfected post-petition;29 and (iii) whether the
FDIC's claims on notes acquired from an insolvent bank were compulsory
counterclaims in the maker's fraud action against a bank. 30 Certiorari has
been granted, however, in a Ninth Circuit case, In re BFP,31 which held that
the price received at a non-collusive, regularly conducted foreclosure sale
irrebuttably establishes the reasonably equivalent value in the context of Sec-
tion 548. This allows a trustee to avoid fraudulent transfers of a debtor's
interest in property.
As Judge Clark also points out, the Supreme Court issued at least one
other opinion with ramifications for all federal practitioners, including those
who find themselves in bankruptcy court. In Harper v. Virginia Department
of Taxation32 the Supreme Court established a new precedent regarding
whether and to what extent new principles of federal statutory or constitu-
tional law will apply retroactively to other pending cases, stating the new
rule as follows:
When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it,
that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be
given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review and as
to all events, regardless of whether such events pre-date or post-date
our announcement of the rule. 33
In Judge Clark's analysis, he points out that this opinion could have sig-
nificant ramifications in a bankruptcy context, especially in Chapter 13 pro-
ceedings, which do not become "final" until a plan is completed and a
discharge is granted. 34
B. FIFTH CIRCUIT
During the Survey period, the United States Court of Appeals for the
27. See Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Greystone III Joint Venture (In re Greystone III
Joint Venture), 948 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 72 (1992); Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Bryson Properties, XVIII (In re Bryson Properties, XVIII), 961 F.2d 496 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 191 (1992).
28. Crozier v. Bradford (In re Layman), 958 F.2d 72 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
328 (1992).
29. Farmers Branch and Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. (In re Pointer),
952 F.2d 82 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3035 (1992).
30. Douglass v. NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank, 979 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1992) (ruling that the
FDIC's claims on notes acquired from an insolvent bank were not compulsory counterclaims
in the bank's fraud action), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 68 (1993).
31. BFP v. Imperial Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re BFP), 974 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1992).
32. 113 S. Ct. 2510 (1993).
33. Id. at 2517; see also James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 11 S. Ct. 2439 (1991);
Murray v. Anthony J. Bertucci Constr. Co., 958 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1992).
34. Clark, supra note 26, at J-8.
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Fifth Circuit addressed numerous issues interpreting both federal bank-
ruptcy law and state law.
1. Dischargeability
The Fifth Circuit addressed dischargeability under Section 523 of the
Bankruptcy Code on at least four different occasions. First, in In re Cos-
ton, 35 the court revisited the issue of "whether the reasonableness of a credi-
tor's reliance under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B)" on a false financial statement
"is an issue of law subject to de novo review on appeal or a question of fact
to be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. ' 36 Initially, the Fifth
Circuit reversed a district court's decision upholding a bankruptcy court's
finding that the creditor reasonably relied on the debtor's financial state-
ments.37 The finding was based on the Fifth Circuit's previous application
of the de novo standard of review. 38 In its initial opinion, the Fifth Circuit
held that the bank's reliance on the debtor's financial statement "without so
much as making a single telephone call to verify liquidity simply was not
reasonable. ' '39
Subsequently, the court noted its conflict with the policy of other cir-
cuits 40 and granted rehearing en banc. The court reasoned that the reasona-
bleness of a creditor's reliance should be judged in light of the totality of the
circumstances, and "the bankruptcy judge, who is most familiar with those
circumstances, should have the benefit of the clearly erroneous rule when
making the reasonableness determination. ' 41 Based on this rationale, the
court overruled its previous authority to the contrary. 42 Having reached
that conclusion, the court affirmed the lower court's ruling, holding the sub-
ject debt nondischargeable. 43
The effect of the ruling in Coston is that the reasonableness of a creditor's
reliance on a materially false financial statement will now be viewed in light
of the totality of the circumstances. Furthermore, a bankruptcy court's find-
ings of fact will not be set aside unless the appellate court is "left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." 44
35. Coston v. Bank of Malvern (In re Coston), 991 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1993).
36. Id. at 259. Section 523(a)(2)(B) provides that an individual debtor may not be dis-
charged from any debt obtained by a materially false written financial statement on which a
creditor reasonably relied and that the debtor made or published with an intent to deceive that
creditor. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B) (1988).
37. See In re Coston, 987 F.2d at 1100.
38. Id.; see In re Jordan v. Southeast Nat'l Bank (In re Jordan), 927 F.2d 221, 225 (5th
Cir. 1991) (stating that reasonableness of reliance is a conclusion of law subject to de novo
review).
39. Coston v. Bank of Malvern (In re Coston), 991 F.2d 257, 259-60 (5th Cir. 1993) (quot-
ing In re Coston, 987 F.2d at 1101).
40. Id. at 260. Compare Jordan v. Southeast Nat'l Bank (In re Jordan), 927 F.2d 221, 225
(5th Cir. 199 1) ("reasonableness of reliance is conclusion of law") with Bank One, Lexington v.
Woolum (In re Woolum), 979 F.2d 71, 75 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1645 (1993)
(reasonable reliance is finding of fact).
41. In re Coston, 991 F.2d at 261.
42. Id. at 260 (overruling In re Jordan, 927 F.2d 221).
43. Id. at 262.
44. Id. at 261.
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Approximately a month later, the Fifth Circuit faced another situation
involving a false financial statement. In In re Young 45 the debtor had sub-
mitted what the bankruptcy court found was a false financial statement in an
effort to obtain a financial guarantee bond. The bankruptcy court found that
the bonding company's reliance was reasonable. In applying Coston, the
Fifth Circuit reiterated its earlier holding that reasonable reliance is to be
determined from the totality of the circumstances, and a bankruptcy court's
fact finding on that issue is subject only to review for clear error. 46 Addi-
tionally, the contract documents between the debtor and the bonding com-
pany provided for payment of attorneys' fees in the event of default. The
Fifth Circuit held that the attorneys' fees, in light of New York law, were
likewise nondischargeable. 47
In In re Bennett 48 the Fifth Circuit addressed Subsection (a)(4) of Section
523, 49 which provides that debts resulting from defalcation by the debtor
while acting in a fiduciary capacity are not dischargeable. In Bennett the
debtor was the managing partner of a limited partnership that was in turn
the managing partner of another limited partnership. The limited partners
in the second tier limited partnership sought a determination of dis-
chargeability based upon the debtor's defalcation while acting as what
amounted to the managing partner of the managing partner of the subject
partnership.
The court first determined that in the context of a limited partnership, the
general partner or managing partner, who typically has substantial control
over the affairs of the partnership, stands in the same fiduciary capacity to
the limited partners as a trustee stands to the beneficiaries of a trust.50 Hav-
ing determined that a managing general partner was in essence a fiduciary,
the next step was to determine whether such a fiduciary status should be
imposed on one who is not actually the managing partner but rather oper-
ates, controls, or manages the managing partner of a limited partnership.
The court noted that in the Texas cases addressing this issue, the control
enjoyed by the person in question has always been the critical fact. 5'
Having determined that Bennett essentially controlled the limited partner-
ship in question, the court determined that Bennett's charging of repairs (re-
sulting from alleged mismanagement) and equipment leases to the limited
partners amounted to a willful neglect of his duties as the managing partner
45. Young v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. (In re Young), 995 F.2d 547
(5th Cir. 1993).
46. Id. at 549. The existence of white-outs and handwritten additions to the financial
statement did not constitute a "red flag" giving rise to a duty to investigate. Additionally, the
court noted uncontroverted testimony that the relevant practice in the industry was to rely
solely on documentation presented by the applicant. Id.
47. Id. at 550.
48. LSP Inv. Partnership v. Bennett (In re Bennett), 989 F.2d 779 (5th Cir. 1993).
49. An individual may not be discharged from any debt arising out of "fraud or defalca-
tion while acting in a fiduciary capacity." 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (1988).
50. In re Bennett, 989 F.2d at 787; see also Crenshaw v. Swenson, 611 S.W.2d 886, 890
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Watson v. Limited Partners of WCKT, Ltd.,
570 S.W.2d 179, 182 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
51. In re Bennett, 989 F.2d at 789.
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of the managing partner of the limited partnership. Therefore, those claims
were nondischargeable. 52 Additionally, the court found that Bennett's pay-
ment of an unauthorized distribution to himself constituted a breach of his
duty of good faith and fair dealing, also non-dischargeable under Subsection(a)(4). 51
More recently, the Fifth Circuit addressed a common issue arising in dis-
chargeability litigation: the question of issue preclusion. In In re Davis54 the
debtor had been found liable in litigation between the debtor, the majority
owner of a corporation, and its minority owner. A state court (pre-petition)
awarded substantial damages based on jury findings that the debtor had en-
gaged in a conspiracy to deprive a corporation's minority shareholder of
stock ownership, in addition to committing other wrongful acts. In addition
to monetary damages, the trial court granted several equitable remedies, in-
cluding resulting trust, partition in kind, deed reformation, appointment of a
receiver, and dissolution of a partnership. The state court judgment was
affirmed in substantial part on appeal. 55
The defendant then filed bankruptcy, and the successful state court claim-
ant sought a determination of nondischargeability based upon the state court
judgment. The evidence in the bankruptcy court consisted of the state court
judgment, the jury's instructions and answers, the appellate court opinion,
and testimony of both parties. The entire trial court record was not intro-
duced. 56 Noting that the Supreme Court had recently reaffirmed that issue
preclusion principles apply in Section 523 proceedings, 57 the Fifth Circuit
applied the three elements of issue preclusion, 58 finding that issue preclusion
applied to Davis and affirmed the district court's findings that the damage
claims were nondischargeable. 59 The court then addressed the equitable
remedies imposed by the lower courts. The court found three of the five
equitable remedies nondischargeable, in part because there were no money
damage alternatives.60
52. Id. at 790-91. "Defalcation is a willful neglect of duty, even if not accompanied by
fraud or embezzlement." Id. at 790; see also Moreno v. Ashworth, 892 F.2d 417, 421 (5th Cir.
1990).
53. In re Bennett, 989 F.2d at 791.
54. Sheerin v. Davis (In re Davis) 3 F.3d 113 (5th Cir. 1993).
55. See Davis v. Sheerin, 754 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ
denied).
56. Sheerin v. Davis (In re Davis), 3 F.3d at 114-15.
57. Id. at 114; see Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 284 (1991).
58. The elements include the following:
(1) the issue to be precluded must be identical to that involved in the prior
action;
(2) in the prior action, the issue must have been actually litigated; and
(3) the determination made of the issue in the prior action must have been nec-
essary to the resulting judgment.
In re Davis, 3 F.3d at 114.
59. Id. at 114. The jury findings regarding the conspiracy allegations and "oppressive"
conduct of the debtor were sufficient to preclude relitigation of those issues. Id. at 115. The
court declined to impose a requirement that the plaintiff introduce the entire trial record from
the state court trial. Id. at 114-15 (citing Tober Saifer Shoe Co. v. Allman (In re Allman), 735
F.2d 863, 865 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1086 (1984)).
60. Id. at 116-17.
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In a case handed down after the Survey period, the Fifth Circuit held that
a Chapter 7 debtor's discharge of debt in excess of $2,000,000.00 was prop-
erly denied for disposing of or encumbering numerous non-exempt assets
within a year prior to his bankruptcy. In In re Swift6 1 the debtor prepaid
otherwise dischargeable alimony and satisfied the remaining liability on his
otherwise exempt truck. He also under-reported insurance renewal commis-
sions and transferred insurance policies to a family member. There were
also short term pre-petition loans and encumbrances between the debtor and
various family members immediately pre-petition. Presumably, this case
will be reported in the next annual Survey.
2. Chapter 11 Plan Confirmation - Single Asset Cases
The Fifth Circuit affirmed a bankruptcy court's confirmation of a single
asset case presented by In re Briscoe Enterprises, Limited 11.62 The case is
significant because of the Fifth Circuit's determination of the burden of
proof in the context of plan confirmation. The court also addressed separate
classification in light of Greystone,63 not to mention the fact that the case was
single asset bankruptcy.
The court found that in both, a consensual plan and a cram-down, the
appropriate burden of proof is the preponderance of the evidence standard. 64
The two standards addressed by the court were preponderance of the evi-
dence and clear and convincing evidence. According to the court, "prepon-
derance means that it is more likely than not. Clear and convincing is a
higher standard and requires a high probability of success."' 65 In addition to
the other requirements of Section 1129, which are addressed in the opinion,
the court faced a situation where the debtor had classified separately claims
of unsecured creditors. This has been a topic of great interest in the context
of Chapter 11 reorganizations since the Fifth Circuit's ruling in In re Grey-
stone,6 6 where the court held that classification of similar claims "in order to
gerrymander an affirmative vote on a reorganization plan" is prohibited. As
the Briscoe opinion points out, however, Greystone recognized that there
may be good business reasons to support separate classification in certain
circumstances. 67 The court found those business purposes present in Briscoe
Enterprises, emphasizing, however, the narrowness of its holding.68 The
court also found that the plan was proposed in good faith, and also made the
61. Swift v. Bank of San Antonio (In re Swift), 3 F.3d 929 (5th Cir. 1993).
62. Heartland Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Briscoe Enters., LTD. II (In re Briscoe En-
ters., LTD., II), 994 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1993).
63. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Greystone III Joint Venture (In re Greystone III
Joint Venture), 948 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 72 (1992).
64. In re Briscoe Enters. LTD., III, 994 F.2d at 1165.
65. Id. at 1164 (citations omitted). The court followed the Supreme Court's ruling in
Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991), in which the court applied the preponderance of the
evidence standard to a dischargeability determination.
66. 995 F.2d 1274, 1279 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 72 (1992).




other findings necessary to permit cram-down under Section 1129(b).69
3. Avoidable Transfers
As discussed elsewhere in this article, 70 Section 548 of the Bankruptcy
Code allows a trustee or debtor-in-possession to avoid a transfer of an inter-
est of the debtor in property made or incurred within one year pre-petition if
the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily received less than a reasonably
equivalent value.71 In In re Besing72 the transfer in question was the dismis-
sal, with prejudice, of a state court claim asserted by the debtor. In the state
court litigation, the debtor's claim was dismissed, with prejudice, as a result
of apparent discovery abuse. 73 The lower courts had held that the dismissal
was not a transfer within the context of Section 528, so the debtor's action to
avoid the transfer was unsuccessful. The Fifth Circuit affirmed but on other
grounds.
The Fifth Circuit found that the dismissal of the plaintiff's claim was a
transfer within the broad meaning of that term, which includes involuntary
transfers and dispositions of property brought about by state judicial pro-
ceedings. 74 "Congress intended for the Code's definition of transfer to be as
broad as possible."75 The transfer, however, was found by the Fifth Circuit
to be for reasonably equivalent value because the debtor's state court claims
apparently had no merit. Accordingly, even though the Fifth Circuit found
that there was a transfer, the debtor failed to establish the other primary
element: The transfer was without reasonably equivalent value. Therefore,
the Fifth Circuit affirmed.76
4. Eligibility
In In re Lindsey, Stephenson & Lindsey 77 a case originating in the North-
ern District of Texas, the Fifth Circuit held that a nonrecourse obligation
was not only a "claim" held by the creditor (the FDIC), but it was also a
"debt" for purposes of computing Chapter 12 eligibility. The debtor had
asserted that although a nonrecourse note to the FDIC was a claim under
the Bankruptcy Code,78 because there was no recourse liability on the part
of the debtor, the claim should not be included as a debt 79 for purposes of
69. Id, at 1167-69.
70. See infra notes 96 & 131-32.
71. II U.S.C. § 548 (1988).
72. Besing v. Hawthorne (In re Besing), 981 F.2d 1488 (5th Cir. 1993).
73. Id. at 1490.
74. Id. at 1492-93.
75. Id. at 1492 (citing S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1978)).
76. Id. at 1496-97.
77. Lindsey, Stephenson & Lindsey v. Federal Deposit Ins. Co. (In re Lindsey, Stephen-
son & Lindsey), 995 F.2d 626 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1053 (1994). The lower
court opinion was subsequently published at 158 B.R. 75 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
78. Under the Bankruptcy Code, "claim" means a right to payment, regardless of
whether it is liquidated, fixed, contingent, or disputed, or a right to an equitable remedy. 11
U.S.C. § 101(4) (1988).




computing the debtor's aggregate debt in the context of Chapter 12 eligibil-
ity.80 The Fifth Circuit disregarded this attempt at a distinction between the
two definitions, relying on at least one United States Supreme Court case
reiterating congressional intent that the meanings of "debt" and "claim" be
co-extensive.8' Based on this analysis, the amount of the nonrecourse claim
was included in the eligibility computation, and the debtor was ruled ineligi-
ble for Chapter 12 relief.8 2
5. Discrimination
The Fifth Circuit reiterated the Bankruptcy Code's prohibition against
discrimination, indicating the court's willingness to assume subject matter
jurisdiction even after a bankruptcy proceeding has been closed. In In re
Bradley 83 the Fifth Circuit reversed the lower courts' dismissal of a debtor's
complaint under Section 525 of the Bankruptcy Code arising two years after
the debtor's discharge. Given the clear importance of Section 525, which
prohibits bankruptcy-based discrimination in the context of government li-
censing and permits, governmental employment, and private employment,
the Fifth Circuit held that a court must assume subject matter jurisdiction in
order to determine whether or not a creditor's action violated the anti-dis-
crimination prohibitions of the Code.8 4 This is true even when such discrim-
ination occurs after a case has been closed.
C. DISTRICT AND BANKRUPTCY COURTS
1. Substantial Abuse
A Texas bankruptcy court issued an extensive opinion on the issue of dis-
missal of a Chapter 7 case for "substantial abuse." In In re Fitzgerald 85
Judge Leif Clark was faced with a trustee's motion to dismiss the debtors'
Chapter 7 petition for substantial abuse. Specifically, the debtors had a com-
bined gross income in excess of $4,800.00 per month, substantial retirement
plans, and, excluding a payment to the debtor's mother, they had approxi-
mately $950.00 per month available for debt payment. The debtors were
advised of the various chapters but chose Chapter 7. They intended to con-
tinue to repay a debt owed to the debtor's mother. The trustee moved for
80. Only "family farmer(s) with regular annual income" are eligible for relief under Chap-
ter 12. 11 U.S.C. § 109(t (1988). To be considered a family farmer, a debtor's aggregate debts
may not exceed $1,500,000.00. 11 U.S.C. at § 101(17) (1988).
81. In re Lindsey, Stephenson & Lindsey, 995 F.2d at 628; see Pennsylvania Dept. of Pub.
Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 557-58 (1990) (concluding that Congress intended to
adopt the broadest possible definition of the term "claim"); Johnson v. Home State Bank, 111
S. Ct. 2150, 2155 (1991) (finding that a mortgage interest, as a kind of non-recourse loan,
constitutes a "claim" for bankruptcy purposes).
82. In re Lindsey, Stephenson & Lindsey, 995 F.2d at 628.
83. Bradley v. Barnes (In re Bradley), 989 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1993).
84. Id. at 804-05. The Fifth Circuit, citing Applegate v. March, 64 B.R. 448, 450 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1986), noted that "[n]o court in the realm holds such a wide subject matter jurisdic-
tion as does the Bankruptcy Court ... the entirety of § 525, every word, is utterly sweeping."
In re Bradley, 989 F.2d at 804.
85. 155 B.R. 711 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993).
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dismissal, 86 alleging substantial abuse under Section 707(b) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. The trustee argued that the debtors' schedules and budget re-
flected a present ability to fund a Chapter 13 plan that would have yielded a
significant return to creditors. The trustee also mentioned the debtors' ef-
forts to prefer the wife's mother over similarly situated creditors.87
The court adopted what can be described as a "last resort" analysis. The
primary question asks, "is there no other choice available?"8 8 In applying
its "last resort" analysis, the court noted the numerous alternatives available
to the debtors that had not been pursued and granted the trustee's motion. 89
This could be a significant decision for Texas practitioners who should think
twice before filing a Chapter 7 petition on behalf of a debtor who has an
ability to resolve his or her debt situation by a means other than Chapter 7.90
This author would suggest that Fitzgerald is must reading for all debtors'
counsel.
2. Property of the Estate; Disclaimers as Transfers
In In re Brajkovic 91 the debtor inherited real estate interests in Missouri
within a year prior to her Chapter 7 filing in Texas. Prior to the bankruptcy
filing, the debtor disclaimed her inheritance to allow it to pass to her four
minor children under the decedent's will, in accordance with Missouri law.
The bankruptcy court found that although a disclaimer "relates back" to the
death of the decedent, it does not change the fact that a "transfer" of prop-
erty occurred. 9 2 Disregarding a case out of the Seventh Circuit, Judge Kelly
86. See II U.S.C. § 707(b) (1988) (United States trustee and court given standing to dis-
miss a case based on substantial abuse of Chapter 7).
87. In re Fitzgerald, 155 B.R. at 712-13.
88. Id. at 716. The court noted that the test should be broader than whether and to what
extent the debtors can fund a Chapter 13 plan. In other words, the court should look to other
alternatives besides court-supervised repayment systems. Id. The court mentioned other alter-
natives such as consumer credit counseling services, assignment for the benefit of creditors, a
family supported volunteer payment system, and even Chapter 13 relief. Id. Essentially, this
was somewhat of a hybrid of the approach taken in two cases reviewed by Judge Clark. Com-
pare Zolg v. Kelly (In re Kelly), 841 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1988) (debtor's ability to fund Chapter
13 plan is primary factor) with In re Harris, 960 F.2d 74 (8th Cir. 1992) (narrow standard
applied, somewhat of a rebuttable presumption approach; inquiry into "egregious behavior"
disregarded as a prerequisite for dismissal). The Fitzgerald court disagreed with the approach
taken by the 4th Circuit. See Green v. Staples, (In re Green), 934 F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1991)
(numerous, and somewhat contradictory, factors taken into account).
89. In re Fitzgerald, 155 B.R. at 717-18.
90. For a more extreme example, see In re Nolan, 140 B.R. 797 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992).
In that case, the debtor was a sportscaster earning in excess of $170,000 per year. The court
also noted numerous necessary lifestyle-related expenses incurred by the debtor all the while
the debtor was seeking to discharge his personal liability under Chapter 7. There, the court
focused on the debtor's ability to pay his debts, not simply whether he would qualify for Chap-
ter 13 relief. Id. at 802-03 (discussing various approaches taken by courts discussed by Judge
Clark in the Fitzgerald case).
91. Lowe v. Brajkovic (In re Brajkovic), 151 B.R. 402 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993).
92. Id. at 409-10. Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a trustee may avoid
any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property made or incurred within one year before
the filing of the bankruptcy, if the debtor received less than a reasonably equivalent value and
was insolvent on the date that the transfer was made. I 1 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1988). The Bank-




When a beneficiary executes a disclaimer, she "parts with" an "interest
in property," i.e., her vested albeit inchoate, interest in property of the
decedent. The moment prior to the execution, she has an equitable in-
terest. The moment after, she does not. That is a transfer, pure and
simple, and no matter what state law says the effect of such a disclaimer
might be, state law may not define the transfer away if, as of the mo-
ment of execution, all the requisites for transfer under the Bankruptcy
Code are present. No matter how it redefines property interests the
moment after the execution of the disclaimer, Missouri law does not
purport to rewrite property interests for the time before the execution of
the disclaimer. Nor may it, because by doing so, state law would oper-
ate to define the transfer out of existence after the fact.93
The Court disagreed with the Seventh Circuit's analysis in In re Atchi-
son ,94 in which the Court held that a valid disclaimer under Illinois law
retroactively erased any interest in the person doing the disclaiming. 95 Ac-
cordingly, the Brajkovic court found that an interest in property was created
on the date of the decedent's death and that a transfer of that interest oc-
curred upon the debtor's pre-petition execution of the disclaimer. Thus, the
transaction was held to meet all of the requirements of a voidable transfer
under Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code.96
In In re Hart97 Judge John Akard found that a Chapter 12 debtor's inher-
itance received after the last year of the three-year term of the Chapter 12
plan constituted property of the estate but would not be included within
disposable income for purposes of the plan.98 The court reasoned that
although the inheritance was received before the case was closed and defined
as property of the estate, the decedent's date of death (and therefore the date
the property vested in the debtor) fell well after the conclusion of the
debtor's final "crop year." It was beyond that anticipated by or the creditors
were otherwise covered by the plan.99
3. Lien Avoidance
a. Tools of the Trade
In two opinions authored by Judge John Akard, he reiterated the effect of
the Supreme Court's holding in Owen v. Owen. °0 Owen held that a judicial
voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in prop-
erty ...... 11 U.S.C. § 101(50) (1988).
93. In re Brajkovic, 151 B.R. at 410.
94. Jones v. Atchison (In re Atchison), 925 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1991).
95. Id. at 211-12.
96. In re Brajkovic, 151 B.R. at 411-12.
97. 151 B.R. 84 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993).
98. Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that property of the estate includes
property that the debtor acquires or becomes entitled to acquire within 180 days after the date
of filing. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1988). Additionally, in a Chapter 12 proceeding, property of the
estate includes, in addition to that provided by § 541, property acquired by the debtor after the
commencement of the case but before the case is closed. 11 U.S.C. § 1207(a) (1988).
99. In re Hart, 151 B.R. at 86-87.
100. 111 S. Ct. 1833 (1991). Section 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a debtor
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lien could be avoided under Section 522(0 of the Bankruptcy Code even
though a state statute excluded otherwise exempt property encumbered by a
lien.10 1 This holding effectively overruled Fifth Circuit decisions to the ef-
fect that property encumbered by a lien could not qualify for exemption
under Texas law, and liens on that property could not be avoided. 10 2 The
two opinions were issued in In re Davis10 3 and In re Neal.104 Because of an
apparent settlement in In re Neal, that opinion was vacated; therefore, this
discussion will focus on the Davis case.
Before reviewing Davis, however, it is necessary to go back to Owen and
its progeny. The Lubbock court first applied Owen to In re Nash, 10 5 in
which the debtors sought to avoid non-possessory, non-purchase money
liens against tractors and other items of farm equipment used in the debtor's
farming operation. The court, applying Owen retroactively, focused the is-
sue on whether this type of farm machinery and equipment was exempt
under the Texas Property Code. 10 6 The Court noted that only items "pecu-
liarly adapted to" the debtor's trade or profession are exempt as tools of the
trade; but, this could include larger items such as farm equipment. 0 7 The
court ruled that Nash's farm equipment qualified as tools of the trade under
Texas exemption statute, and because those items took on the character of
the state statute providing the exemption, they could be avoided under Sec-
tion 525(0.108
Following Nash, the court was faced with another farmer seeking to avoid
a non-purchase security interest in five items of farm equipment based upon
the same analysis provided in Nash. 10 9 In Davis, however, some of the items
were referenced only in security agreements predating the effective date of
the Bankruptcy Code. The court allowed avoidance of the security interests
that postdated the Code, but it did not allow avoidance as to items contained
in security agreements predating the Code.' 1" The importance of Davis is
that it reiterates the court's holding in Nash.
may avoid the fixing of a lien on certain exempt property if the lien is a non-possessory, non-
purchase money security interest in a variety of items, including implements, professional
books, or tools of the trade of the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 522(0 (1988).
101. Owen, 111 S. Ct. at 1838.
102. See Bessent v. United States (In re Bessent), 831 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1987); Allen v. Hale
County State Bank (In re Allen), 725 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1984).
103. 148 B.R. 473 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992).
104. 148 B.R. 468 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992), opinion vacated, 156 B.R. 529 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1993).
105. 142 B.R. 148 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992).
106. Id. at 151-53. The Texas Property Code provides that farming or ranching vehicles or
equipment and tools, equipment, books, and apparatus used in a trade or profession are ex-
empt. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
107. In re Nash, 142 B.R. at 152 (noting further that there is no longer a requirement that
tools of the trade under the Texas exemption apply only to small hand tools or tools of incon-
sequential value) (citing Hrncirik v. Farmers Nat'l Bank (In re Hrncirik), 138 B.R. 835, 839-
40 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992) (large farm items)); In re Hernandez, 131 B.R. 61, 63 (Bankr.
W.D. Tex. 1991) (two gooseneck trailers, a stock trailer, and a box scraper exempt).
108. In re Nash, 142 B.R. at 153-54.
109. In re Davis, 148 B.R. at 475-77.
110. Id. at 476-77.
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Obviously, the ability to avoid non-purchase money liens against farm
equipment has far-reaching implications in agricultural financing. Under
Owen, it is clear that a debtor for whom farm equipment is legitimately a
tool of the trade may avoid a non-purchase money, non-possessory lien. The
Texas Legislature has attempted to address Owen by way of an amendment
to Chapter 42 of the Texas Property Code. Specifically, the amendment pur-
ports to prohibit the avoidance of any liens or security interests against ex-
empt property solely on the ground that the property is otherwise exempt. 1 I
The practical effect of this amendment is uncertain unless and to the extent
there is a corresponding amendment to the Bankruptcy Code. As of this
writing, such legislation had been introduced in Congress, but its outcome is
uncertain as of this writing.12
b. Homesteads - Judgment Liens
In In re HendersonI13 the court dealt with an attempt at lien avoidance
under Section 522 in a slightly different context. The debtors were denied a
discharge under Section 727 of the Bankruptcy Code. Prior to their bank-
ruptcy, an abstract of judgment had been recorded creating a judicial lien
against all of the non-exempt real property of the debtors located in the
county of filing.1 14 Having been denied their discharge, the debtors sought
to avoid the judgment lien under Section 522. They claimed that it impaired
their homestead exemption. The court held that the debtor could file a mo-
tion to avoid the lien, even though the subject debt was nondischargeable,
because the purposes of nondischargeability and lien avoidance are
different. 15
That said, however, because of the well-established principle that a Texas
judgment lien will not attach to a homestead, there is no impairment of the
debtor's homestead exemption and no encumbering lien to be avoided." 16
The court interpreted Owen v. Owen, discussed above, to the effect that the
purpose of Section 522 is not to confirm or document the absence of liens but
to remove voidable liens attached to property so that the debtor may enjoy
111. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994). The amended statute
now provides as follows:
(b) Personal property, unless precluded from being encumbered by other law,
may be encumbered by a security interest under Section 9.203, Bus. & COMM.
CODE, or Sections 41 and 42, Certificate of Title Act (Article 6687-1, VERNON'S
TEX. CIv. STAT.), or by a lien fixed by other law, and the security interest or lien
may not be avoided on the ground that the property is exempt under this chapter.
Id.
112. H.R. 339, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (proposed "Secured Credit Availability
Amendments of 1993," introduced by Bill Sarpalius).
113. 155 B.R. 157 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992).
114. The Texas Property Code governs the creation of judgment liens by way of recording
and indexing of an abstract of judgment. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 52.001 (Vernon Supp.
1994). A judgment lien, however, does not attach to a pre-existing homestead. TEX. CONST.
art. XVI, § 50 (Vernon Supp. 1993); see also TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001 (Vernon Supp.
1994). Essentially, § 522(0 is not dependent upon or related to the nature of the debt secured
by an otherwise voidable lien. In re Henderson, 155 B.R. at 159.
115. In re Henderson, 155 B.R. at 159.
116. Id. at 160.
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the exemption to which he is entitled. 1 7 The Court concluded that "where
state exemption laws mandate that judicial liens do not attach to a debtor's
exempt homestead, a debtor's Section 522(0(1) motion to avoid the lien is
unavailing and must be denied."'I18 Therefore, the debtor's motion to avoid
the judgment lien was denied." 19
4. Dischargeability of Student Loans
Section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that an individual may
not be discharged from liability for most student loans absent certain limited
statutory exceptions. 120 In at least one Texas bankruptcy court decision, it
was held that this non-dischargeability, when applicable, applies not only to
the student, but to any person liable on such a debt. In In re Mackey 12 1 the
court held that this subsection of the Code "does not refer to student debtors
but limits the discharge of any individual debtor for any debt for covered
educational loans. The fact that the student was the maker of the loan and
the debtor the co-maker does not change the result."' 22 According to the
bankruptcy court, this was a matter of first impression in the Fifth Cir-
cuit; 123 however, the court's ruling was consistent with an earlier district
court ruling on the same issue. 124
5. Automatic Stay
In In re Abacus Broadcasting Corp. 125 the court construed Section 362(h)
of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides that "an individual injured by any
willful violation of a stay" shall receive actual damages, possibly including
costs, attorneys' fees, and, where appropriate, punitive damages.' 26 The
court, in interpreting this statute based upon its plain meaning, held that
because of the use of the word "individuals," this damage provision of Sec-
tion 362 is inapplicable to corporate debtors.127 The court noted that a cor-
porate debtor is not without relief, however, but has a remedy under the civil
contempt of powers found in Section 105 of the Code. 128
In In re First City Asset Servicing Co. 129 Judge Harold C. Abramson de-
117. Id. at 161, citing Owen v. Owen, III S. Ct. 1833, 1835-36 (1991).
118. In re Henderson, 155 B.R. at 161.
119. Id.
120. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1988).
121. Mackey v. Nebraska Student Loan Program (In re Mackey), 153 B.R. 34 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 1993).
122. Id. at 35; see Pelkowski v. Ohio Student Loan Comm'n (In re Pelkowski), 990 F.2d
737 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Dull v. Ohio Student Loan Comm'n (In re Dull), 144 B.R. 370
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992).
123. In re Mackey, 153 B.R. at 35.
124. See Education Resources Inst. v. Varma (In re Varma), 149 B.R. 817 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1992) (holding guaranteed student loan for education of debtors' son nondischargeable).
125. 150 B.R. 925 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993).
126. 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (1988).
127. In re Abacus Broadcasting Corp., 150 B.R. at 926-27.
128. Id. at 928; see II U.S.C. § 105 (1988).
129. First City Asset Servicing Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (In re First City Asset Serv-
icing Co.), 158 B.R. 78 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993).
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nied the FDIC's motion to dismiss an adversary proceeding that was based
on the FDIC's alleged violation of the automatic stay. The court held that
the bankruptcy court had subject matter jurisdiction notwithstanding FIR-
REA's comprehensive, administrative claims procedure. 130
6. Durrett Rule
The so-called "Durrett Rule" was applied to set aside a sheriff's sale to
satisfy delinquent real property taxes. In In re Hernandez'31 local taxing
authorities obtained a judgment lien against the debtor for unpaid real prop-
erty taxes. The property was sold at a sheriff's sale for less than half its
appraised value. The bankruptcy court found that the foreclosure sale was
voidable under Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code, because the debtor was
insolvent at the time of the transfer, and the seller received less than reason-
ably equivalent value.' 32 The court invalidated the sheriff's sale, allowing
the purchasers a lien against the property for the purchase price plus interest
at the rate of ten percent per annum. 133
7. Redemption; Section 521
In In re Harper 134 Judge Larry Kelly found that under Section 521 of the
Code, a debtor is not limited exclusively to redemption or reaffirmation
when a debtor desires to retain property that secures consumer debt. 35 The
practical effect of this holding according to Judge Kelly is that so long as a
debtor remains current on any payment obligations, the debtor would be
allowed to maintain possession of his or her property. Also, in the event of
default, the creditor would still be entitled to repossession. 136 Judge Kelly's
opinion predates the Survey period, but it is included because of the exist-
ence and development of authority to the contrary, in particular circuit level
caselaw developing in other courts of appeals during the survey period.' 37
130. Id. at 79-82.
131. Hernandez v. Cantu (In re Hernandez), 150 B.R. 29 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1993).
132. Id. at 30. See generally Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir.
1980). Section 548 allows a bankruptcy trustee to avoid any voluntary or involuntary transfer
made within one year of the bankruptcy if the debtor received less than. reasonably equivalent
value and was insolvent. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1988).
133. In re Hernandez, 150 B.R. at 30-31.
134. 143 B.R. 682 (Bankr. W.D. Tex, 1992).
135. Id. at 686-87. Section 521 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a debtor shall within
thirty (30) days after filing a Chapter 7 case:
(A) ... file with the clerk a statement of his intention with respect to the reten-
tion or surrender of such property and, if applicable, specifying that such prop-
erty is claimed as exempt, that the debtor intends to redeem such property, or
that the debtor intends to reaffirm debts secured by such property;
(B) ... within 45 days after the filing of a notice of intent ... the debtor shall
perform his intention with respect to such property...; and
(C) ... nothing contained in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph shall
alter the debtor's or the trustee's rights with regard to such property.
11 U.S.C. § 521(2) (1988).
136. Id. at 686.
137. See Taylor v. Ace Fed. Credit Union (In re Taylor), 3 F.3d 1512, 1513-16 (11th Cir.
1993) (if debtor retains secured property, debtor must either redeem or reaffirm); In re Ed-
wards, 901 F.2d 1383 (7th Cir. 1990) (same holding). But see Home Owners Funding Corp. of
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Essentially, the authority on which Judge Kelly relies finds Section 521 to be
procedural in nature, compelling debtors to inform secured creditors of their
intentions with respect to certain property. Moreover, the last subsection of
Section 521 specifically provides that the notice provisions contained in Sec-
tion 521 do not alter the rights of the debtor or trustee with regard to the
property in question. As one commentator has noted, the approach taken in
Harper and the cases on which it relies appears to be the more reasoned
approach. 138
8. Chapter 11 Plan Confirmation - More Separate Classification
In In re Schoeneberg' 39 the separate classification issue raised in Greystone
was again revisited. As was the situation in Briscoe Enterprises discussed
above, 14° separate classification was allowed because there was no "gerry-
mandering."' 4' The opinion is also instructive on other plan confirmation
issues in a cram-down context.
9. Valuation
Two Chapter 13 cases provide somewhat of a contrast in the approaches
taken to valuation issues. As noted by one of the courts, "no other area is
more central to the bankruptcy process yet more perplexing to those practi-
tioners and courts presented with its permutations than the question of valu-
ation of assets."' 42 In In re Carlan143 the court addressed valuation of a
vehicle. The court declined to look exclusively to the debtor's proposed use,
and the court was also concerned that neither the debtor nor the secured
creditor received a windfall from the court's valuation. Accordingly, the
court placed the value "somewhere between wholesale and retail."' 44
In In re Sherman, 145 decided within two weeks after Carlan, the court
addressed valuation of pasture land owned by Chapter 13 debtors. The
court based its valuation according to its highest and best use.' 46 The debt-
ors had used the property in the past for agricultural purposes, and the debt-
ors purported that the same future use was anticipated. The court then
struggled with the effect of language contained in Section 506(a) of the Code,
which provides that value should be determined "in light of the purpose of
the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property
Am. v. Belanger (In re Belanger), 962 F.2d 345 (4th Cir. 1992), and Lowry Fed. Credit Union
v. West, 882 F.2d 1543 (10th Cir. 1989), both of which accord with Harper.
138. As noted in Harper, Collier is critical of the Seventh Circuit's decision in Edwards.
Collier notes that the court simply ignored subsection (C) and its legislative history. See 3
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 521.09(A) (1992).
139. 156 B.R. 963 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993).
140. See supra notes 62-69.
141. In re Schoeneberg, 156 B.R. at 967-69.
142. In re Sherman, 157 B.R. 987, 989 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1993).
143. 157 B.R. 324 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1993).
144. Id. at 326.
145. See supra note 142.
146. Id. at 990. "Highest and best use is defined as the reasonable, probable, and legal use
of vacant land or an improved property which is physically possible, appropriately supported,
financially feasible, and results in the highest value." Id.
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.... $9147 Apparently, the court was concerned with setting the value too low
and then allowing the debtor to liquidate the property at a greater value by
utilizing it for its highest and best use. The court interpreted Section 506 to
mean that the court should consider all factors. The court found that valu-
ing the property at its agricultural use (pasture land), allowing the debtors to
pay only that value to the secured creditor, would be inequitable and amount
to a confiscation of the creditor's property for no legitimate purpose. 148 Ad-
ditionally, the court found that the debtors, in exchange for the opportuni-
ties provided by Chapter 13, are bound by an affirmative duty to maximize
values and returns for assets that are property of the estate. Accordingly,
the court found that the subject property should be valued at its highest and
best use, which was considered to be use as rural, residential home sites. 149
II. CREDITORS' RIGHTS
A. EXEMPTIONS; HOMESTEADS
Much of the action with respect to the nature and extent of the Texas
homestead exemption came out of the bankruptcy courts, which although
arising in a bankruptcy context, involved interpretations of state law. Thus,
these opinions are discussed in this section of the article.
1. Urban or Rural?
First, in In re Davis'50 the district court reversed a bankruptcy court de-
termination that Section 41.002(c) of the Texas Property Code provided the
definitive method for classifying a homestead as either rural or urban.' 5'
The district court reversed, turning to the more traditional factors in deter-
mining whether the debtors' claimed exemption of over thirty-two acres was
permissible as a rural homestead exemption. The factors to be considered
include: the location of the land with respect to nearby city limits; the loca-
tion of the tract in question; the existence of municipal utilities and services;
the use of the land and adjacent property; and the presence or absence of
platted streets, blocks, and the like. 152 The court then remanded the matter
back to the bankruptcy court with instructions to address the homestead
issue based upon the traditional factors outlined in the opinion and not re-
stricted by the Property Code subsection discussed above. 1 5 3
147. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
148. In re Sherman, 157 B.R. at 991-92.
149. Id. at 992.
150. Thornberry v. Davis (In re Davis), 152 B.R. 133 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1992).
151. At the time of the bankruptcy court ruling, the subsection in question provided as
follows: "A homestead is considered to be rural if, at the time the designation is made, the
property is not served by municipal utilities and fire and police protection." TEX. PROP. CODE
ANN. § 41.002(c) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
152. In re Davis, 152 B.R. at 135; see also Bradley v. Pacific Southwest Bank (In re Brad-
ley), 960 F.2d 502, 511 (5th Cir. 1992); Vistron Corp. v. Winstead, 521 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1975, no writ).
153. In re Davis, 152 B.R. at 135.
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2 Business Homestead Claimed by Surviving Spouse
In In re Finkel154 the bankruptcy court addressed the issue of whether a
surviving spouse who did not continue her deceased husband's business op-
erations could claim a business homestead exemption. The court applied the
common test for determining whether a business homestead exemption ex-
ists. Those conditions require that the head of the family must have a calling
or business to which the subject property is reasonably adapted and reason-
ably necessary, and the property must be used as a place to exercise the
calling or business of the head of the family. 155 In Finkel the widow was
essentially a passive investor in her husband's company, and she turned over
control of the business to her son well in advance of her bankruptcy filing.
The court therefore held that Ms. Finkel intended to abandon and did aban-
don the business. 156 In light of the fact that the debtor's fifty year-old son
resided with her, the court addressed whether the claimed homestead could
be a "family" homestead, or whether, and to what extent, the widow could
claim the homestead as a continuation of her deceased spouse's homestead.
The court found that the debtor's exemption claim did not qualify under
either test, because the son was not financially dependent on the debtor, and,
notwithstanding the ability to claim a continuing homestead as a widow, the
debtor had abandoned the homestead. 157
Finally, the court addressed an earlier Fifth Circuit decision. The deci-
sion held that an individual may lease property claimed as business home-
stead to a corporation owned and operated by the individual who still holds
a right to the business homestead exemption.158 The court likewise disre-
garded that claim as well. The critical fact being the continued operation of
the business by the debtor, regardless of the entity used, which was lacking
in this case. 159
3. Loan Renewals; Fees and Expenses
In In re Freytag'60 the court held that the assignment of a note and lien,
which was originally a legitimate purchase money and construction lien en-
forceable under Texas homestead laws, did not adversely affect the validity
of the lien. The loan in question was originated in compliance with Texas
Property Code requirements; 161 however, it had been assigned to another
154. 151 B.R. 779 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993).
155. Id. at 781; see also Webb v. Reserve Life Ins. Co. (In re Webb), 954 F.2d 1102, 1108
(5th Cir. 1992); In re Krug, 102 B.R. 98, 99 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989).
156. In re Finkel, 151 B.R. at 783-84. "With business homesteads, we look for facts show-
ing a voluntary discontinuance of the business, i.e., facts which demonstrate a cessation of any
further intent to continue in the business." Id. at 783.
157. Id. at 785-86.
158. See Taylor v. Knostman (In re John Taylor Co.), 935 F.2d 75, 77 (5th Cir. 1991).
159. Id.
160. Freytag v. American Fed. Bank (In re Freytag), 155 B.R. 150 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1993).
161. Id. at 154-55. The Texas Property Code provides as follows: "(b) Encumbrances may
be properly fixed on homestead property for: (1) purchase money; (2) taxes on the property; or
(3) work and material used in constructing improvements on the property if contracted for in
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lender, and the payments and interest rates had been adjusted. Additionally,
loan fees and other fees and expenses were added as part of the renewal and
extension of the note. The court held, however, that both the borrowers and
the lender acted in good faith to preserve the debtor's homestead rights, and
they did not "intentionally increase the burden on the homestead" in a man-
ner prohibited by Texas homestead laws.' 62
4. Business Homestead: Non-Contiguous Lots; Written Disclaimers
In another business homestead case, a bankruptcy court addressed the is-
sue of whether a business homestead exemption may extend to two or more
non-contiguous lots. This issue had to be addressed in the face of one or
more disclaiming affidavits and language in one or more deeds of trust to the
effect that the subject property did not constitute the debtor's homestead.
Finally, the court had to address whether and to what extent D'Oench
Duhme could bar the debtor's assertion of his homestead rights in light of
the deeds of trust contained in the bank's files.
In In re Hughes16 3 the debtor claimed certain property as both his residen-
tial and business homestead. The debtor leased approximately thirty percent
of the subject property to his sole proprietorship, 64 which the court found
was the debtor's principal occupation. The rest of the property was leased to
other unrelated businesses. 165 The court quickly disposed of the issue of
whether the debtor could occupy two noncontiguous lots as a business
homestead. The court noted that although a business homestead exists only
writing as provided by Sections 53.095(a), (b) and (c)." These sections require that such con-
tract be made "before the material is furnished or the labor is performed and in a manner
required for the conveyance of a homestead, with joinder of both spouses if the homestead
claimant is married." TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.059(a)-(c) (Vernon 1994). The original
construction loan was documented by way of a deed of trust for construction costs, payable to
the debtor's contractor, which then simultaneously assigned its note and its mechanic's lien to
the bank. Additional funds were borrower to complete the house, financed in the same manner
and by the same parties as the original construction loan. After the parties moved in, a new
deed of trust note was executed and delivered in renewal, extension, and consolidation of the
two construction notes. This is not unlike documentation of the typical construction loan on
property to be used as a borrower's homestead. In re Freytag, 155 B.R. at 152.
162. In re Freytag, 155 B.R. at 154-55. The Freytag court noted that there was no new
advance of cash, and the adjustment and fees were limited to matters necessarily included in
effectuating the transaction, which the court held permissible under Texas law. Id. at 155; see
Machicek v. Barcak, 141 Tex. 165, 169, 170 S.W.2d 715, 717 (1943) (The borrower "may
change the form of the obligation so long as he acts in good faith and does not intentionally
increase the burden on the homestead for purposes other than are necessary for the readjust-
ment of the outstanding obligation.").
163. Hughes v. Team Bank (In re Hughes), 153 B.R. 736 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993),
amended in part on recons., objection denied, 159 B.R. 197 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993). The
initial decision at 153 B.R. 736 has since been withdrawn by the publisher and may currently
be found at 1993 Bankr. LEXIS 650 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993).
164. The sole proprietorship was originally a corporation, but it had lost its corporate sta-
tus years earlier. This was not crucial to the court's analysis.
165. In re Hughes, 153 B.R. at 742. The court found that the usage of a portion of the
property was sufficient to impress the entire property with a business homestead character. Id.
at 742 n.6. As alluded to by the Finkel court, the fact that the debtor leased the property to a
corporation wholly owned and operated by him did not affect the property's homestead char-
acter. Id.; see Taylor v. Knostman (In re John Taylor Co.), 935 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1991).
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in connection with the principal business of the homestead claimant, the
business homestead itself can consist of two or more noncontiguous lots. 166
Over a period of years and in conjunction with a series of renewals, exten-
sions, and consolidations, the debtor had executed two affidavits. In the affi-
davits, he claimed that he did not use or claim the subject property as a
business or residence homestead, nor did he have any intention of doing
so. 1 67 Additionally, the debtor executed one or more deeds of trust, pursu-
ant to which he reiterated the claimed validity and binding nature of the
liens purportedly granted against the subject property. The court essentially
disregarded the affidavits and the deeds of trust. The court found that
neither was binding upon the plaintiff, apparently based in part on the fact
that during much of the time the debtor was openly and obviously utilizing
the property as a homestead.168
Finally, the creditor, a successor by merger to another bank that was an
assignee of the FDIC as receiver for yet another bank, claimed that the
D'Oench Duhme doctrine barred the debtor from offering evidence that the
subject property was his homestead in contradiction of his earlier written
representations. The court held, however, that homestead rights exist in-
dependent of any agreement, scheme, or bank representation. As the Fifth
Circuit had earlier noted, "the reach of Section 1823(e) is not so broad as to
override Texas homestead laws." 169
5. Estoppel by Written Disclaimer
A state court opinion provides an example of when a debtor may be es-
topped from claiming a homestead interest. In NCNB Texas National Bank
v. Carpenter 170 two borrowers had asserted a rural homestead claim with
respect to property that was being used in conjunction with their sons' dairy
operation. Like the debtor in In re Hughes, discussed above, one or more
documents had been signed disclaiming any homestead interest in the prop-
erty. Unlike Hughes, however, the debtors were not actually using the prop-
erty for themselves; rather, the property was being used by their sons. The
debtors, nevertheless, asserted that they were entitled to a homestead claim
because of the references in the Texas Constitution to the homestead "of a
family."' 7 '
On the family issue, the court noted that there must be a legal or moral
responsibility on the head of the family for the support of the rest of the
166. In re Hughes, 153 B.R. at 741. This issue had apparently been well settled by the
Texas Supreme Court. See Ford. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 424 S.W.2d 612, 616 (Tex. 1968). Lots
that are used "in aid of' but not essential to the business are not likewise protected; Webb v.
Reserve Life Ins. Co. (In re Webb), 954 F.2d 1102 (5th Cir. 1992).
167. In re Hughes, 153 B.R. at 740-41.
168, Id. at 743-44.
169. Id. at 744 (citing Patterson v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 918 F.2d 540, 544-45 (5th
Cir. 1990). Section 1823(e) is essentially the codification of the so-called "D'Oench Duhme
doctrine." See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1988).
170. 849 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993, no writ).
171. Id. at 879-81; see also TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50; TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 41.002(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
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members of the family and a corresponding dependence by the others upon
the head of the family. In Carpenter that apparently did not exist.
With respect to the estoppel issue, the court acknowledged that estoppel
may not arise in favor of a lender attempting to secure a lien on homestead
property when the borrower is in actual use and possession of the property
despite written or oral assurances to the contrary. 172 On the other hand,
when the debtor makes representations that were intended to be and in fact
were relied upon by a lender, the homestead claimant may be estopped to
claim the exemption when there are facts open to observation that could lead
to a conclusion that the property is in fact not homestead. 73 In Carpenter
the court found that there were material fact issues existing as to who actu-
ally possessed and used the subject property. The appellate court reversed
the trial court ruling in favor of the debtors.
6. Proceeds
Despite Texas' rather liberal homestead exemption, and the lengths to
which some courts will go to protect that exemption, the Fifth Circuit has
made it clear that a borrower may not simultaneously claim a homestead
exemption in both the proceeds of his prior homestead and his interest in his
current homestead. In In re England 174 the debtor claimed both a newly
acquired ranch and note proceeds from the sale of his prior homestead as
exempt property under Chapter 41 of the Texas Property Code. The court
acknowledged that homestead proceeds are exempt for a six-month period,
but applying the plain meaning of Chapter 41, the court also found that once
the new homestead is acquired the prior homestead is abandoned. There-
fore, the proceeds then relate to a former homestead. 75 The court framed
the issue as whether the proceeds of the sale of a former homestead are ex-
empt. The court held they were not, the primary object of the proceeds
exemption being to allow the homestead claimant to invest the proceeds in
another homestead.' 76 In England that mission had been accomplished
which obviated the need for a homestead exemption.
B. FDIC / RTC
1. Statutes of Limitation (Six- Year and Four- Year)
During the Survey period, the Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of applica-
172. Carpenter, 849 S.W.2d at 880. "Possession and use of land by one who owns it and
who resides upon it makes it the homestead in law and in fact." Id. (citing First Interstate
Bank v. Bland, 810 S.W.2d 277, 286 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, no writ)).
173. Id. at 881.
174. England v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. (In re England), 975 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir. 1992).
175. Id. at 1172-73. Section 41.001(c) of the Texas Property Code provides as follows: "(c)
The homestead claimant's proceeds of a sale of a homestead are not subject to seizure for a
creditor's claim for six months after the date of sale." TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001(c)
(Vernon Supp. 1992) (text as of the date of the opinion).
176. In re England, 975 F.2d at 1174-75; see Taylor v. Mosty Bros. Nursery, Inc., 777
S.W.2d 568, 570 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, no writ) ("The six-month provision was
enacted in order that the proceeds might be reinvested in another homestead.").
19941
SMU LAW REVIEW
bility of federal statutes of limitations to loans held by failed financial institu-
tions. Specifically, the Fifth Circuit has resolved the issue of whether and to
what extent the federal six-year statutes apply to assignees of the FDIC;
however, Texas courts remain divided.
a. Federal Courts
Perhaps the most significant opinion in the context of debt collection arose
in Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Bledsoe,177 in which the court ad-
dressed the applicability of the federal statutes of limitation to a private,
non-governmental assignee. In Bledsoe the note in question was originally
owned by State Savings & Loan Association of Lubbock, which was declared
insolvent on December 19, 1985. The next day, the FSLIC transferred sub-
stantially all of the State Savings' assets, including the subject note, to State
Federal Savings & Loan Association of Lubbock, a private institution. The
note was again assigned to the FSLIC on August 26, 1988, when State Fed-
eral Savings was declared insolvent. Approximately a year later, while the
note was still held by the FSLIC, Congress passed FIRREA, pursuant to
which Congress abolished the FSLIC and transferred all of the FSLIC's as-
sets to the FDIC. 78 On FIRREA's effective date, the note passed into the
hands of the FDIC. 179
The district court granted the guarantor's motion for summary judgment
based on the Texas four-year statute of limitations. 80 The Fifth Circuit
then traced what it called the juridical journey of the note. When the note
was first transferred to the FSLIC, the FSLIC was subject to the federal six-
year statute of limitations then in effect, which began to run when the cause
of action accrued, effective the date the note matured.' 81 It is at the next
stage of the note's journey that the crucial issue arose, that being whether
the FSLIC's six-year statute of limitations under Section 2415 was trans-
ferred to State Federal Savings, a private entity, when the note was assigned;
or whether, upon transfer to a private party, the statute of limitations re-
verted to Texas' four-year period. This is crucial, because had the court
concluded that upon the transfer to State Federal Savings the state statute
applied, the note would have become barred by limitations on May 27, 1988,
and the government would have been unable to revive a claim that had be-
come stale. ' 82
The opposite would have resulted, however, if the federal six-year period,
177. 989 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1993).
178. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(2)(A) (1988).
179. Bledsoe, 989 F.2d at 807.
180. Id.; see TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.004(a)(3) (Vernon 1986).
181. Every action for money damages brought by the United States or an agency thereof
based upon an express or implied contract is barred unless filed within six years after the cause
of action accrues. See 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) (1988).
182. See Bledsoe, 989 F.2d at 808; FDIC v. Hinkson, 848 F.2d 432, 434 (3d Cir. 1988)
("[I]f the state statute of limitations has expired before the government acquires a claim, it is
not revived by transfer to a federal agency."); see also RTC v. Boyar, Norton & Blair, 796 F.
Supp. 1010, 1013 (S.D. Tex. 1992) ("[G]overnmental acquisition of a claim cannot revive a
cause of action already barred by state law - legal malpractice claim.").
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then in effect, would have applied, thus extending the limitations period
through May 27, 1990. Therefore, on August 26, 1988, when FSLIC reac-
quired the note, and on August 9, 1989, the effective date of FIRREA, the
claim would have remained viable. The ultimate analysis was quite simple.
The court applied the common law principle that an assignee stands in the
shoes of his assignor, so the transfer to State Savings included the six-year
statute. The holding was based on earlier authority where the federal holder
in due course doctrine and the D'Oench Duhme doctrines have been applied
under this same principle.18 3
The effect of Bledsoe is that when the FSLIC was appointed receiver of
State Savings, the FSLIC received the benefit of the then general six-year
limitation period applicable to government entities. Because the note was
still alive at the time FIRREA was enacted, the six-year statute of limitation
in FIRREA applied retroactively to this pending claim. Under FIRREA,
the six-year statute began to run on the later of (i) the date of the appoint-
ment of the receiver or (ii) the date on which the cause of action accrued.
The fact that a private entity owned the note at one time did not deprive the
holder of the note of this six-year statute.18 4
Prior to Bledsoe, the Fifth Circuit declined to extend FIRREA's retroac-
tive application to a claim that had already been barred under Section 2415
prior to FIRREA's effective date. In FDIC v. Belli 185 the court acknowl-
edged that FIRREA would be applied retroactively, but only to claims that
were not already barred as of FIRREA's effective date. 186 The significance
of Belli is that the Fifth Circuit refused to imply that under the general fed-
eral statute a cause of action accrued when the FDIC or FSLIC acquired the
failed bank's assets, as is now provided under FIRREA. In so holding, the
court applied the plain meaning of the statute.187
The net effect of these two holdings is that the statute of limitations under
FIRREA, which is somewhat more protective of the FDIC than that found
under Section 2415, will be applied retroactively. This retroactive applica-
183. Bledsoe, 989 F.2d at 810-11; FSLIC v. Cribbs, 918 F.2d 557, 559 (5th Cir. 1990)
("[Tlhe FDIC and subsequent note holders enjoy holder in due course status whether or not
they satisfy the technical requirements of state law"); Porras v. Petroplex Say. Ass'n, 903 F.2d
379, 380-81 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that the D'Oench Duhme protection transferred to private
assignee of FSLIC because "the policy behind D'Oench Duhme applies with equal force where
the purchaser is a private party."); Bell & Murphy & Assoc., Inc. v. Interfirst Bank Gateway,
N.A., 894 F.2d 750, 754 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 895 (1990) ("[A]ssignees of the
FDIC also enjoy protection from claims or defenses based upon unrecorded side
agreements.").
184. Bledsoe, 989 F.2d at 809; 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14)(B) (Supp. III 1991).
185. 981 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1993).
186. Id. at 842-43.
187. Id. at 840. The Third Circuit, in FDIC v. Hinkson, 848 F.2d 432, 434 (3d Cir. 1988),
held that under Section 2415, a cause of action on a note accrued when the FDIC acquired the
failed bank's assets. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit held that a cause of action against former
officers and directors for breach of fiduciary duties similarly accrued under Section 2415 when
the FDIC acquired those claims by assignment. FDIC v. Former Officers and Directors of
Metropolitan Bank, 884 F.2d 1304, 1307-09 (9th Cir. 1989). The Tenth Circuit, however, has
held that a cause of action on a note under Section 2415 accrued on the date the note matured.
FDIC v. Galloway, 856 F.2d 112, 116 (10th Cir. 1988).
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tion should only apply, however, to notes that are not already time barred
when acquired by the government.1 88 According to the Fifth Circuit, these
holdings now apply not only to government entities, but also to private non-
governmental assignees of assets of failed financial institutions. 89
This may not be the case, however, in every context. In Prince v. First
City Texas-Houston 190 a Texas court of appeals held that the six-year statute
of limitations under FIRREA was inapplicable to an "open bank assistance
transaction."' 19 1 The court refused to hold that the assisted buy out of First
City Bank-Houston was in essence a "constructive receivership" and that
the successor banks were performing tasks that otherwise would have been
performed by the FDIC. 192 Because there was no actual receivership, and
the FDIC never became a party in interest, the court applied the four-year
limitations period. 193
b. State Courts
Under Bledsoe the Fifth Circuit has clearly established that an assignee is
entitled to the protection of FIRREA's six-year limitation period. As of this
writing, however, the Texas courts of appeals are in conflict on this issue,
and the Texas Supreme Court has granted writ in two cases that it has con-
solidated for purposes of addressing this issue. 194 Perhaps the best history of
the split in the court of appeals is found in John Luce Builder v. First Gibral-
tar Bank 195 in which the Austin Court of Appeals reiterated its holding in
Thweatt v. Jackson,196 and held that common law principles applicable to
assignees vested a non-governmental transferee with the same rights as the
188. Bledsoe, 989 F.2d at 808 ("It is well established that the subsequent transfer of a note
to the government cannot revive a claim that is already stale."); FDIC v. Wheat, 970 F.2d 124,
128 n.7 (5th Cir. 1992) ("Had the state limitations period expired [when the FDIC took over
the bank], then the FDIC would have no rights."); FDIC v. Hinkson, 848 F.2d 432, 434 (3d
Cir. 1988) ("If the state statute of limitations has expired before the government acquires a
claim, it is not revived by transfer to a federal agency."); see also Guaranty Trust Co. v. United
States, 304 U.S. 126, 142 (1938) ("The United States never acquired a right free from a pre-
existing infirmity, the running of limitations against its assignor, which public policy does not
forbid.").
189. Bledsoe, 989 F.2d at 810-11.
190. 853 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ).
191. Id. at 694.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 693-94 (citing City of Houston v. First City, Texas, 827 S.W.2d 462, 466-67,
477-79 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1992, writ denied)).
194. Compare Thweatt v. Jackson, 838 S.W.2d 725, 727 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992), aff'd,
37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 555 (March 9, 1994) (holding that FIRREA's six-year statute applies to
assignee; "assignee of a promissory note stands in the shoes of the assignor") with Federal Debt
Management, Inc. v. Weatherly, 842 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ granted) (stat-
ing that six-year federal statute does not apply; statutes of limitations are remedial in nature
and do not constitute substantive law or a right of action belonging to a particular party); see
also Pineda v. PMI Mortgage Ins. Co., 843 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992),
writ denied per curiam, 851 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. 1993); see also Mountain States Fin. Resources
Corp. v. Agrawal, 777 F. Supp. 1550 (W.D. Okla. 1991) (applying FIRREA statute to private
assignee).
195. 849 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ denied).
196. See supra note 194.
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FDIC. 197 Interestingly, in one of the cases cited in John Luce Builder, the
supreme court denied a borrower's application for writ of error in a case
arising out of the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals.1 98
2. Tax Liens vs. The FDIC
In State v. Bankerd 199 local taxing authorities filed suit against a property
owner and a bank that held a deed of trust lien on the property. The bank
was declared insolvent and the FDIC became a party to the litigation as the
bank's receiver. The FDIC answered, asserting that the tax liens were not
superior to the FDIC's interest in the property because of federal statutes
prohibiting involuntary liens against the property of the FDIC.2°° The court
held that the FDIC's newly acquired lien constituted property under the
federal statute, and as such, was not subject to foreclosure of the state's in-
voluntary lien, even in face of the taxing authority's due process rights. 20 1
The trial court ordered foreclosure of the tax liens subject, however, to the
FDIC's lien, which the appellate court affirmed.20 2
C. ENFORCEMENT OF PERSONAL PROPERTY SECURITY INTERESTS
1. Private Sales; Good Faith Purchaser
In Thomas v. Price203 a former partner in a private banking enterprise
challenged the foreclosure sale of his partnership interest by a secured credi-
tor. The Fifth Circuit affirmed a summary judgment in favor of the secured
creditor.204 The crux of the debtor's complaint was that the disposition of
the collateral was by private sale to a buyer whom the debtor alleged was not
acting in good faith.
First, the court addressed the private nature of the sale. Disagreeing with
the debtor's assertions that a private sale should be subject to closer scrutiny
than a private sale, the court noted that in many circumstances, a private
sale is actually the preferred method of disposition, citing the comment to
Section 9.504 of the UCC.20 5 The court added that where the collateral was
197. Id. at 727-28.
198. See Pineda v. PMI Mortgage Ins. Co., 843 S.W.2d 660, 669 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1992), writ denied per curiam, 851 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. 1993).
199. 838 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied).
200. Id. at 640. See 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1991).
201. Bankerd, 838 S.W.2d at 642.
202. Id. at 641-43. The court held that Section 1825(b), enacted as part of FIRREA,
prevailed over 28 U.S.C. § 2410, which provided somewhat of a waiver of sovereign immunity.
Id. See also Rust v. Johnson, 597 F.2d 174, 179 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 964 (1979)
("[L]ocal governments cannot take any action to collect unpaid taxes assessed against property
which would have the effect of reducing or destroying the value of a federally held purchase
money mortgage lien.").
203. 975 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1992).
204. Id. at 240.
205. Id. at 238. The official comment to Section 9.504 provides as follows:
It is hoped that private sale will be encouraged where, as is frequently the case,
private sale through commercial channels will result in higher realization on
collateral for the benefit of all parties. The only restriction placed on the se-
cured party's method of disposition is that it must be commercially reasonable.
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an interest in a partnership, "[A] private sale was almost certain to result in
a higher realization on the collateral. ' '206
The borrower also attempted to rely on Subsection (d) of Section 9.504,
specifically to the extent that it provides that a good faith purchaser at a
foreclosure sale takes free of the debtor's rights in the collateral. 20 7 The
debtor argued that in order to receive the protections under Section 9.504, a
buyer must act in good faith, the implication being that the lack of good
faith on a buyer's part could invalidate a foreclosure sale.
This case represents a misapplication of the plain meaning of the statute,
the primary purpose of which is to protect a good faith purchaser from a
situation where the foreclosing secured party may have failed to comply with
requirements of Article 9 regarding disposition of collateral. In other words,
even in a situation where there may be a lack of notice or commercial rea-
sonableness, a good faith purchaser may obtain the property free and clear of
any such claims. 208 To raise the issue of the purchaser's lack of good faith, a
debtor must first establish that the secured party did not act in a commer-
cially reasonable manner. Only then is the purchaser's good faith, or lack
thereof, an issue. The Thomas court noted that there was no allegation or
proof of the lack of commercial reasonableness. Therefore, Section 9.504,
which is simply a savings clause for a good faith purchaser, had no
application. 20 9
2. Transfer of Inventory Outside Ordinary Course of Business
In Amarillo National Bank v. Komatsu Zenoah America, Inc.2 10 the Fifth
Circuit addressed a secured creditor's claim that a transfer of lawn care
products (inventory), in which the secured creditor had a perfected security
interest, constituted conversion. Amarillo National Bank had provided fi-
nancing to the debtor, secured by a written security agreement granting the
bank a security interest in all inventory, accounts, notes, proceeds, and
goods owned by the debtor. The debtor distributed certain lawn care prod-
ucts purchased from Komatsu Zenoah America, Inc. (KZA). After the
bank perfected its security interest in the debtor's inventory, the debtor
transferred to KZA its stock of the KZA-financed lawn care products, in
return for which KZA issued the debtor a credit memorandum in partial
satisfaction of the debtor's preexisting debt to KZA.
The court, applying Texas law, held that the transfer of the lawn care
products from the debtor to KZA did not occur, by definition, in the ordi-
nary course of business.2 1' Because the transfer was outside the ordinary
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.504 cmt. I (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
206. Thomas, 975 F.2d at 238.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 238-39.
209. Id. at 239-40.
210. 991 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1993).
211. Id. at 276; see Crocker Nat'l Bank v. Ideco, 889 F.2d 1452, 1454 (5th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 495 U.S. 919 (1990); see also TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(9) (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1991). The Texas UCC defines buying in the ordinary course of business to be:
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course of the debtor's business and in light of the bank's prior perfected
security interest in the inventory (which included lawn care products), the
court held that the bank presented a valid claim for conversion and re-
manded to the lower court for a determination of damages under the bank's
conversion claim.212
3. Perfection of Purchase Money Security Interest Within Grace Period
In Citizens National Bank v. Cockrell2t 3 the Texas Supreme Court ad-
dressed the meaning of the term possession within the provision of the UCC
governing the twenty-day grace period for perfection of a purchase money
security interest. 214 In Cockrell, Cockrell sold a mini-blind manufacturing
business to Sydnor. On August 1, a written agreement for the immediate
sale, assignment, and transfer of the business and its assets was signed, and
the Sydnors began operating the business that day. The Sydnors paid cash
and signed a promissory note. The Sydnors agreed to grant Cockrell a se-
curity interest in the transferred assets, but apparently the parties failed to
sign the security agreement at that time. Cockrell remained active in the
day-to-day operations of the business and had access to the personal prop-
erty until early October. According to Cockrell, he was concerned about
relinquishing control of the equipment to the Sydnors while there were still
orders in process for which he was responsible. On or about October 3,
however, there were developments in the business that led the parties to be-
lieve that it was time for Cockrell to turn over complete control of the busi-
ness to the Sydnors. Cockrell turned over his set of keys to the Sydnors, and
on or about the same day, the parties apparently executed the security agree-
ment and signed a financing statement. Cockrell filed the financing state-
ment with the Secretary of State four days later, on October 7, 1985.
Meanwhile, prior to October, the Sydnors had become indebted to a bank
secured by all equipment then owned or thereafter acquired by the Sydnors.
The bank filed a financing statement in May of the same year. When the
Sydnors acquired rights in the equipment by purchasing the assets from
Cockrell, the bank's security interest attached to the collateral and became
perfected. 215
After assuming complete control of the business, the Sydnors defaulted on
for cash or by exchange of the other property or on secured or unsecured credit
and includes receiving goods or documents of title under a preexisting contract
for sale but does not include a transfer in bulk or as security for or in total or
partial satisfaction of a money debt.
Id. § 1.201(9) (emphasis added).
212. Komatsu, 991 F.2d at 277-78.
213. 850 S.W.2d 462 (Tex. 1993).
214. Section 9.312(d) of the Texas Business & Commerce Code gives a purchase money
security interest priority over a conflicting security interest "if the purchase money security
interest is perfected at the time the debtor receives possession of the collateral or within 20 days
thereafter." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.312(d) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1993)
(emphasis added). In most states, the comparable Code section provides for a 10-day grace
period. See Cockrell, 850 S.W.2d at 466.
215. Cockrell, 850 S.W.2d at 463; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.203 & 9.303
(Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
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their bank obligations. The bank foreclosed on the equipment and sold it to
a third party. Cockrell then sued the bank alleging conversion because his
purchase money security interest had priority over that claimed by the bank.
The issue, therefore, was whether the perfection of Cockrell's security inter-
est in October was within the twenty-day grace period after the Sydnors
received possession of the equipment.21 6 The court noted that the term pos-
session is not defined in the UCC. The court considered significant, how-
ever, that the Code section in question referred to possession rather than
rights in the collateral. 21 7 The court reversed the court of appeals, which
had limited the concept of possession to a power over property exercisable to
the exclusion of all other persons. 21 8 The court felt that notwithstanding
Cockrell's continued presence in the business, the equipment in question was
in the Sydnors' place of business beginning on August 1 and no evidence
existed to suggest that the parties set aside the equipment or otherwise spe-
cially labeled to identify or denote a purchase money security interest. Be-
cause of this possession by the Sydnors on August 1, the court found that the
October filing of a financing statement was not within the twenty-day grace
period, which actually commenced on the Sydnors' possession of the
property.219
4. Equitable Exception to Bank's Offset Rights
In FDIC v. Golden Imports, Inc. 220 a bank that provided floor plan financ-
ing for an automobile broker offset funds in the broker's account. The ac-
count secured the broker's floor plan bank financing, along with a security
interest in the broker's inventory. At the time of the death of the president
of the auto broker, whose death represented an event of default under the
bank's loan agreement, the broker had certain funds on deposit that were
designated to pay an outstanding draft to another dealer. The funds repre-
sented payment by the purchaser of the automobile that the broker
purchased from the dealer holding the outstanding draft. After the bank
exercised its right of set-off, there were no funds in the bank to pay the draft,
and the wholesaler did not forward the car title to the ultimate customer.
The customer and the wholesaler filed suit against the bank claiming conver-
sion of the specific account funds. The court held that notwithstanding the
fact that the bank's security interest in the account would normally entitle
the bank to offset any funds on deposit, Texas courts allow an equitable
exception to a bank's right of set-off when, on reasonable inquiry, the bank
would discover that the funds were held by a depositor on behalf of a third
party. 22 1
216. Cockrell, 850 S.W.2d at 463.
217. Id. at 465.
218. Id. at 466.
219. Id. at 466.
220. 859 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, n.w.h.).




In Western Auto Supply v. Brazos Port Bank 222 two secured parties
claimed competing security interests in the same collateral. One of the se-
cured parties had agreed to the subordination of its security interest. The
secured party in whose favor the subordination was executed assigned its
security interest and its rights under the subordination agreement. The
court of appeals held that because the subordination agreement did not ad-
dress assignment, the subordination was not enforceable by the third party
assignee. Thus, foreclosure by the original secured party was allowed, its
rights being deemed prior to the party claiming the assignment of the subor-
dination agreement. 223
D. REAL PROPERTY FORECLOSURE
1. Wrongful Foreclosure
First State Bank v. Keilman224 is significant not because of the develop-
ment of any new rules of law, but rather as an example of what can happen
when a wrongful foreclosure claim is erroneously submitted to a jury. The
borrowers had executed a series of promissory notes to Frontier National
Bank, the predecessor of First State Bank. The final renewal note provided
for the payment of $152,000.00 plus interest. The note provided that interest
would be payable "at the prime rate established by Frontier National Bank
as described in the [November 1, 1985] note, plus Two percent (12.5%) per
annum." 225 In the original note produced at trial, the number "12.5%" in-
side the parenthesis was deleted and replaced with the numeral "2%."
Again, the written words provided "prime plus two percent. ' 226 Frontier
was subsequently declared insolvent, and the FDIC closed Frontier. First
State Bank purchased the borrower's note from the receivership estate. A
few months later, the borrowers defaulted. First State Bank accelerated the
indebtedness and scheduled a substitute trustee's sale. The bank posted a
notice at the county courthouse and filed with the county clerk in accord-
ance with the Texas Property Code. The notice otherwise complied with the
minimum requirements of the TexasProperty Code.
On the date of the foreclosure, the borrower and a companion drove to the
courthouse to attend the foreclosure sale, scheduled between 10:00 a.m. and
1:00 p.m. Shortly before 10:30 a.m., the borrower left the courthouse to go
to the local newspaper office to see if the sale had been advertised in the
newspaper. Before leaving, the borrower authorized the companion to bid
up to $16,000.00 for the property. Shortly after the borrower left, the substi-
tute trustee arrived and began the sale. The companion asked the substitute
trustee to wait until the borrower returned, but the substitute trustee refused
and conducted the sale. Apparently having misunderstood the borrower's
222. 840 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ).
223. Id. at 159-60.
224. 851 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ denied).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 919.
19941
SMU LAW REVIEW
instructions, the companion stopped bidding at $13,000.00. The substitute
trustee sold the property to First State Bank for $13,200.00. The bank ap-
parently based its bid in part on an appraisal obtained by First State Bank
that placed the value of the property at slightly in excess of $16,000.00.
First State Bank credited the entire $13,200.00 toward the indebtedness on
the renewal note, and the borrowers were subsequently contacted regarding
a payment plan for the remaining deficiency. After the bank received no
response, the bank filed suit to collect on the deficiency.
The borrowers counterclaimed, alleging material alteration of the promis-
sory note, wrongful foreclosure, and usury. Among other things, the jury
found that the bank: (i) altered the note without the borrowers' consent; (ii)
wrongfully foreclosed on the property; (iii) committed usury; and (iv) en-
gaged in a conspiracy with the substitute trustee. The jury found the unpaid
principal balance was $40,000.00 and accrued, unpaid interest was
$18,000.00. Based on these findings, the trial court awarded the borrowers
$293,000.00 in statutory usury penalties, $18,200.00 in actual damages,
$97,000.00 in exemplary damages, and $68,500.00 in attorneys' fees. The
trial court also rendered judgment that the note was void and that the bank
take nothing on its deficiency claim. The bank asserted fifteen points of er-
ror which the appellate court organized into five categories: material altera-
tion; wrongful foreclosure; usury; attorneys' fees; and the bank's deficiency
claim.
With respect to material alteration, the bank asserted both legal and fac-
tual insufficiency of the evidence on which the court of appeals sustained the
bank's points of error.227 The jury found that the borrowers did not consent
to an alteration of the interest rate, but there were no findings of materiality
or fraudulent intent. Because of the absence of the jury findings, the appel-
late court deemed those issues as found by the trial court in a manner to
support the judgment. 228 The practical effect of the alteration of the paren-
thetical number, however, did not work any change or otherwise modify the
legal effect of the contract. The alteration simply represented an effort to
make the number consistent with the written words contained in the note.
The court noted the well-established rule that unambiguous words prevail
over arithmetic numbers in promissory notes.229 Because the written words
were controlling, regardless of the alteration, the court found no evidence to
support a finding of materiality with respect to the alteration.230 The court
also took note of the borrower's testimony, pursuant to which he apparently
understood that the renewal note was to be a variable rate note of prime plus
two percent. 231 Additionally, the borrowers presented no evidence of fraud-
227. Keilman, 851 S.W.2d at 919-20.
228. Id.; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.407(b)(1) (Vernon 1968) ("[A]lteration by
a holder which is both fraudulent and material discharges any party whose contract is thereby
changed unless that party assents.").
229. Keilman, 851 S.W.2d at 920; see also Guthrie v. Nat'l Homes Corp., 394 S.W.2d 494,
495 (Tex. 1965).
230. Keilman, 851 S.W.2d at 920.
231. Id. at 920-21.
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ulent intent, which was an element of their cause of action on which they
were required to present evidence and secure a finding.232
The borrowers based their wrongful foreclosure assertion on three theo-
ries: common law wrongful foreclosure; conspiracy; and violation of the un-
conscionability provisions of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA).
The court of appeals again found that the evidence was both legally and
factually insufficient to support a finding of wrongful foreclosure. 233 The
court addressed the facts in light of the well established principles regarding
the extent of the duties imposed on a mortgagee in conducting a foreclosure
sale. Under Texas law, if a defect or irregularity occurs in the foreclosure
process, the result of which is to deter third parties from bidding, then a
borrower may have a claim against the mortgagee for damages resulting
from the purportedly unfair sale.234 It is well established, however, that
mere inadequacy of consideration does not render a foreclosure sale void if
the sale was otherwise conducted properly. 235 Moreover, a mortgagee is
under no duty to take affirmative action beyond that required by statute or
the deed of trust to ensure a fair sale; in other words, the mortgagee should
avoid affirmatively deterring prospective bidders. 236 As the court stated, "a
debtor may recover damages for common law wrongful foreclosure only if
the mortgagee either (1) fails to comply with statutory or contractual terms,
or (2) complies with such terms, yet takes affirmative action that detrimen-
tally affects the fairness of the foreclosure process. ''237
In their effort to support the jury's findings and the trial court's ruling, the
borrowers claimed among other things that the bank failed to advertise the
foreclosure sale in the manner required by the deed of trust. Apparently, the
deed of trust contained a reference to advertising the time, place, and terms
of the sale. The debtors claimed that this meant the trustee owed a duty to
do more than meet the minimal requirements of the Property Code. 238 In
other words, the bank or the substitute trustee should have advertised the
sale by means other than posting and notice. The court, of course, dis-
agreed, refusing to find the deed of trust ambiguous and applying the plain
meaning of the word "advertise. ' 239 The court relied on resources such as
Black's Law Dictionary to address the issue of the meaning of the word
"advertise." Essentially, the court found that the borrower showed no evi-
dence that the bank obligated itself to engage in one type of advertising over
another.24o
232. Id. at 921.
233. Id. at 921-22.
234. Id.; see Pentad Joint Venture v. First Nat'l Bank, 797 S.W.2d 92, 96 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1990, writ denied).
235. Keilman, 851 S.W.2d at 921. See Tarrant Sav. Ass'n v. Lucky Homes, Inc., 390
S.W.2d 473, 475 (Tex. 1965).
236. Keilman, 851 S.W.2d at 921; Pentad Joint Venture, 797 S.W.2d at 96.
237. Keilman, 851 S.W.2d at 921-22.
238. Section 51.002 of the Texas Property Code provides the minimum requirements for
notice of a trustee's sale. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002 (Vernon 1984 and Supp. 1994).
Compliance with the basic requirements of the statute was not at issue.




Continuing in its efforts to support the wrongful foreclosure finding, the
borrowers made several more assertions. First, the borrowers claimed insuf-
ficient notice because the notice contained only a legal description and not a
common street address, and the sale notice was tacked upon a cluttered bul-
letin board, ending up underneath other papers.241 The court was unswayed
by this assertion, noting the extensive authority regarding the content and
posting of sale notices.242 Second, the borrowers complained of the trustee
conducting the sale in the absence of the debtor. This assertion lacked merit
because it is well established under Texas law that the trustee has no legal
duty to wait for the debtor.243Third, the notice of sale contained warranty
disclaimers not unlike those referenced in Article 2 of the UCC. This com-
plaint was also without merit, despite the fact that the borrowers asserted
this chilled the bidding at the sale.244
The court then addressed the borrowers' conspiracy claims. This failed
primarily because in order to establish a cause of action for a conspiracy, the
purpose to be accomplished as a result of the conspiracy must be unlawful.
In other words, where the purpose to be accomplished is lawful and no un-
lawful means are used, there can be no civil conspiracy. 245 The court found
that the purpose to be accomplished - the foreclosure - was lawful, and no
unlawful means were used. 246 Thus, there cannot be a civil conspiracy. No
civil conspiracy existed in the face of the borrowers' allegations that the con-
spiracy attempted to breach what the borrower claimed to be a fiduciary
duty. In Texas, however, a trustee does not owe a fiduciary duty to a mort-
gagor, rather, the only duty is to act with absolute impartiality and
fairness. 24 7
Moving to the unconscionability assertions, the court noted that only a
consumer may maintain a cause of action for damages and attorneys' fees
under the DTPA.248 The borrowers asserted that they purchased foreclo-
sure services from the trustee, based on the fact that the trustee was to pay
241. Id. at 923.
242. Id.; see, e.g., FDIC v. Myers, 955 F.2d 348, 350 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that under
Texas law, a posted notice was sufficient despite failure to advertise specific time of sale, the
nature of the property being sold, identity of the lender, address and telephone number of the
trustee, and other potential information that would have been available to potential buyers);
Chambers v. Lee, 566 S.W.2d 69, 73 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, no writ) ("If the
notices are actually posted the required number of days prior to the sale, it is not essential that
they remain intact and visible during every one of the intervening days.").
243. Keilman, 851 S.W.2d at 923; see also Bering v. Republic Bank, 581 S.W.2d 806, 808
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
244. Keilman, 851 S.W.2d at 924; see also Henke v. First S. Properties, Inc., 586 S.W.2d
617, 620 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ refd n.r.e.) ("One who bids upon property at a
foreclosure sale does so at his peril.").
245. Keilman, 851 S.W.2d at 925. The essential elements of a cause of action for conspir-
acy are: two or more persons; an object to be accomplished; a meeting of minds on the object
or course of action; one or more unlawful, overt acts; and damages as a proximate result.
Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex. 1983).
246. Keilman, 851 S.W.2d at 925.
247. Id.; see Hammonds v. Holmes, 599 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Tex. 1977) (holding that trustee
must act with absolute impartiality and fairness); FDIC v. Myers, 955 F.2d 348, 350 (5th Cir.
1992) (holding that a trustee does not owe a fiduciary duty to the mortgagor).
248. Keilman, 851 S.W.2d at 928.
[Vol. 47
BANKRUPTCY
himself a commission of five percent (5%).249 Under Texas law, however,
an extension of credit alone does not confer consumer status under the
DTPA,250 even in the context of secured credit.25 1
Finally, the court addressed the borrowers' usury claims, based primarily
on a demand letter sent by the bank's lawyer. The court found that there
was more than a scintilla of evidence to support the borrowers' claim of
unauthorized interest. The jury, however, found an amount of unauthorized
interest totally inconsistent with the evidence presented by either party. The
court stated, "[T]he jury pulled its answer out of a hat. ' 252 Although the
court remanded on this point, it refused to find that the purportedly wrong
foreclosure constituted a valid basis for usury.2 53 The borrowers had as-
serted that the amount that should have been credited against the debt con-
stituted a charge of excessive compensation for the loan of money.
As noted above, there are not necessarily any new legal principles estab-
lished in this opinion. This case is important, however, because it points out
the risks inherent in submission of wrongful foreclosure and other lender
liability claims to a jury, even in the absence of evidence that is either legally
or factually sufficient. Although the appellate court corrected the mistakes
of the trial court, the opinion is nevertheless instructive for lenders and lend-
ers' counsel on the point that preventing even the most minor irregularity is
crucial, if a lender liability claim, meritorious or otherwise, is to be avoided.
2. Equitable Subrogation; Notice
In First National Bank v. O'Dell25 4 the Texas Supreme Court held that
the doctrine of equitable subordination upon satisfaction of a secured mort-
gage indebtedness does not apply to the notice provisions regarding renewal
and extension of a prior lien unless at least one maker of the renewal note is
personally liable on the original note.255 As stated by the court, "The facts
underlying the suit are not simple."' 256 The operative fact was that a bank
acquired first and second liens against the subject property by purchasing the
notes, the payment of which was not at the instance of any debtor liable on
them. Thus, the equitable subrogation doctrine by its literal terms would
not apply.2 57 The court found that a party to a note secured by an inferior
249. Id.
250. Id.; see Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 603 S.W.2d 169, 175 (Tex. 1980).
251. Keilman, 851 S.W.2d at 928; see, e.g., FSLIC v. Kralj, 968 F.2d 500, 507 (5th Cir.
1992); Smith v. United States Nat'l Bank, 767 S.W.2d 820, 824 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989,
writ denied); Briercroft Serv. Corp. v. De Los Santos, 776 S.W.2d 198, 206 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1988, writ denied). The key principle in determining consumer status under the
DTPA is that the goods or services purchased must be an objective of the transaction, not
merely incidental to it. FDIC v. Munn, 804 F.2d 860, 863-64 (5th Cir. 1986); Keilman, 851
S.W.2d at 929.
252. Keilman, 851 S.W. 2d at 931.
253. Id. at 932.
254. 856 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. 1993).
255. Id. at 411.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 415. Essentially, the equitable subrogation doctrine applies when one dis-
charges a lien by paying as a surety or at the request of a debtor or at a judicial sale, that party
1994]
SMU LAW REVIEW
lien could enforce the notice provisions in that inferior note, notwithstanding
the bank's otherwise prior position.258
3. Other Irregularities in Foreclosure Sale
Gainesville Oil & Gas v. Farm Credit Bank 259 presents an example of a
defect in a foreclosure sale that resulted in the sale being set aside. The
borrowers were led to believe prior to a foreclosure sale that certain mineral
interests would not be included in the foreclosure sale. The bank neverthe-
less foreclosed, and the substitute trustee executed and delivered a deed, ap-
parently including the mineral interest in question. The borrowers
purportedly relied on the assurances of a bank officer that their producing
well was not included in the foreclosure, so they did not attend the sale. The
court held that the bank's conduct, which resulted in the borrowers losing
an opportunity to protect themselves by bidding at the sale (which the bor-
rowers apparently claimed they would have done) diminished competition
and stifled a free and open sale. Based upon this irregularity, the court re-
versed a summary judgment and remanded for resolution of fact issues. 260
4. Computation of 21 Day Notice Period
A number of Texas courts during the Survey period struggled with the
computation of the twenty-one day notice period required before a trustee's
sale. This problem appears to have been addressed legislatively, but the
cases leading up to this legislative amendment merit review.
In Onwuteaka v. Kohen261 the owner of a condominium unit alleged
wrongful foreclosure, conversion, and fraud in connection with a lien fore-
closure sale of his unit for nonpayment of maintenance fees. In his first
point of error, the plaintiff claimed the trial court erred in failing to find that
he was provided twenty-one days notice as required under the Texas Prop-
erty Code. 262 Apparently, the plaintiff argued that he was not given the
required notice, because the notices were sent to his condominium unit
rather than his business address.
The court noted that service of notice of a trustee's sale is complete when
deposited in the mail "addressed to the debtor at the debtor's last known
address as shown by the records of the holder of the debt. ' 263 The court
is entitled to be subrogated to the lien of the creditor to the extent of the payment made. Id.;
see Faires v. Cockrill, 88 Tex. 428, 31 S.W. 190, 194 (1895). On the other hand, this doctrine
is not applied when a mere stranger or volunteer pays the debt of another absent an agreement
for subrogation. O'Dell, 856 S.W.2d at 415; Oury v. Saunders, 77 Tex. 278, 13 S.W. 1030,
1031 (1890).
258. 856 S.W.2d at 416.
259. 847 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, no writ).
260. Id. at 664.
261. 846 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
262. Id. Article 51.002(b) of the Texas Property Code as enacted at the time of the sale
provided that notice of the sale must have been given at least 21 days before the date of the
sale. The notice was to be provided by the holder of the debt, by certified mail, on each debtor
who, according to the records of the holder of the debt, is obligated to pay the debt. TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002(b) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
263. Id. § 51.002(e).
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specifically stated that the statute's purpose is to provide a minimum level of
protection for the debtor "and it provides for only constructive notice of the
foreclosure .... To establish a violation of the statute, it must be shown
that the holder of the debt had in its records the most recent address of the
debtor and failed to mail a notice by certified mail to that address. ' '264
The plaintiff also argued that he was provided twenty days rather than
twenty-one days notice, because the day of the foreclosure sale and the date
of posting and mailing should be excluded. The court, however, noted that
based upon the Code Construction Act,265 the first day is excluded and the
last day is included. 266 The plaintiff also asserted other irregularities, essen-
tially consisting of a grossly inadequate sale price due to a purported irregu-
larity, conspiracy, and fraud. The court dismissed those assertions and
affirmed the trial court's finding. 267 A federal district court, in FDIC v.
Royal Park No. 14, Ltd. ,268 reached the same conclusion with respect to the
computation of the twenty-one day notice period. In that case, however, the
court excluded the date of sale rather than the date of notice. 26 9
At least one more court struggled with the twenty-one day notice period.
In Parker v. Frost National Bank 270 the Austin Court of Appeals held that
the day of posting is included in the twenty-one day notice, but the date of
the sale is excluded. 2 71 Additionally, the debtor unsuccessfully attempted to
invoke the additional twenty day notice found in the Property Code regard-
ing mortgages secured by a debtor's principal residence. 272 The court disre-
garded that argument simply because the subject indebtedness was not
secured by the borrower's residence. 273
The Texas legislature has finally addressed the issue of the computation of
the notice period. Section 51.002 of the Texas Property Code has now been
amended to provide that the calendar day on which the notice is given is
included in computing the twenty-one day period; however, the day of the
foreclosure sale is excluded. 274 A similar amendment was included to pro-
264. Onwuteaka, 846 S.W.2d at 892; see also Krueger v. Swann, 604 S.W.2d 454, 457 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
265. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 311.014(a) (Vernon 1988).
266. Onwuteaka, 846 S.W.2d at 893.
267. Id. at 894.
268. 800 F. Supp. 477 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
269. Id. at 482.
270. 852 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ dism'd by agr.).
271. Id. at 742-43.
272. The Texas Property Code requires that a creditor provide a debtor with 20 days notice
and opportunity to cure a default when the indebtedness is secured by the debtor's principal
residence. This 20 day period is in addition to the 21 day notice of trustee's sale, and the notice
must be provided prior to posting of the notice of trustee's sale and the commencement of the
21 day notice period. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002(d) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
273. Parker, 852 S.W.2d at 744-45. Additionally, the debtor had waived notice of intent to
accelerate, which became effective because it was clear and unequivocal and, again, did not
pertain to a debt secured by the debtor's residence. Id.; see also Shumway v. Horizon Credit
Corp., 801 S.W.2d 890, 892 (Tex. 1991) (holding that the waiver of right to notice of intent to
accelerate must be clear and unequivocal).
274. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002(g) (Vernon Supp. 1994). Subsection (g) now pro-
vides as follows: "The entire calendar day on which the notice of sale is given, regardless of
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vide similar computations of the twenty day notice period regarding an op-
portunity to cure an indebtedness secured by a debtor's residence. 275
5. Residential Mortgages - 20 Day Notice
As mentioned above, the Texas Property Code provides that when a debt
is secured by a lien against the debtor's principal residence, the secured cred-
itor must provide twenty days notice and opportunity to cure default prior
to acceleration or foreclosure posting. 27 6 That statute took effect January 1,
1988. In Rey v. Acosta2 7 7 the note in question had been executed and deliv-
ered prior to the effective date of the twenty day notice statute but it was
secured by real property that served as the debtor's residence. After the
debtors failed to pay a series of installments, the secured creditor's lawyer
sent written notice that the note had been declared immediately due and
payable. Acosta, the creditor, thereafter filed suit and was granted judgment
for the amount due under the note.2 78 Apparently, foreclosure had not been
sought.
The borrowers appealed, claiming that they were entitled to the twenty
day notice and opportunity to cure provided in the Property Code provision.
Again, the amendment took effect after the promissory note had been exe-
cuted and delivered. The issue, therefore, facing the appellate court was
whether to apply the amended statute to a contract executed before the stat-
ute's effective date. The court found that the statute was procedural and
remedial in nature, not affecting substantive rights, and therefore the statute
should be applied retroactively. 279 Thus, the twenty day notice was re-
quired. Based upon the failure to give notice under the amended statute, the
court further found that the borrowers were relieved from paying attorneys'
fees or costs.
28 0
The court, however, found the borrowers liable for all past due payments,
given the fact that the creditor's single failure to provide the required notice
of acceleration did not excuse the borrowers from paying required payments
of principal and interest over that period of time.28 ' The court further re-
the time of day at which the notice is given, is included in computing the 21 -day notice period
required by Subsection (b), and the entire calendar day of the foreclosure sale is excluded." Id.
275. Id. § 51.002(d). Subsection (d) now provides that the debtor must be given at least 20
days to cure a default before the notice of sale can be given. The amendment further provides
as follows:
The entire calendar day on which the notice required by this subsection is given,
regardless of the time of day at which the notice is given, is included in comput-
ing the 20-day notice period required by this subsection, and the entire calendar
day on which notice of sale is given under Subsection (b) is excluded in comput-
ing the 20-day notice period.
Id.
276. Id. § 51.002(d).
277. 860 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, n.w.h.).
278. Id. at 656-67.
279. Typically, retroactive laws or laws impairing the obligations of contracts are not per-
mitted. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 16; see also Rey, 860 S.W.2d at 657. Remedial statutes that
do not disturb vested rights, however, may apply retroactively. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 16.
280. Rey, 860 S.W.2d at 658-59.
281. Id. at 658.
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manded for consideration of the borrower's counterclaims under the Texas
Debt Collection Practices Act 28 2 and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act 283
resulting from the premature acceleration of the note.28 4
6. Notice to Last Known Address
In Onwuteaka v. Kohen,285 a case discussed above in the context of
twenty-one day notices, the court also held that notice to a debtor's last
known address is sufficient if addressed to the debtor's last known address as
shown by the records of the holder of the debt.28 6 To establish a violation of
the statutory requirements regarding notice, it must be shown that the
holder of the debt had in its records the most recent address of the debtor
and failed to mail a notice by certified mail to that address.
7 Separate Obligations of Note and Lien
In Whittington v. Whittington2 7 the Beaumont Court of Appeals reiter-
ated the general rule regarding separate obligations of a note and a lien. The
court, in dicta, stated that
where there is a debt secured by a note, in turn secured by a lien, the
note and the lien constitute separate obligations so that suit may be had
on the note to obtain a personal judgment, and later suit may be had on
the lien if the personal judgment is not satisfied. 288
Although this was a divorce case, and the above statement appeared in dicta,
it is significant from the standpoint that it implies that a creditor may seek a
personal judgment on a note, in which event the underlying lien securing
that note would be unimpaired. This is statutory with respect to personal
property security interests, 28 9 but there is no analogous statute requiring real
property foreclosure. 290
282. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. § 5069-11.01 et seq. (Vernon 1987 and Supp. 1994).
283. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.41 et seq. (Vernon 1987 and Supp. 1994).
284. Rey, 860 S.W.2d at 659. "Wrongful acceleration of a real estate note, as occurred
here, violates the Texas Debt Collection Practices Act and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act
as a matter of law." Id.
285. 846 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
286. Id. at 892; see TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002(e) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
287. 853 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, n.w.h.).
288. Id. at 195.
289. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.501 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
290. Whittington, however, reiterates the general rule found in earlier cases:
The holder of a secured note is not required to exhaust his remedies against the
security before enforcing the debt against the original maker, but he may pro-
ceed to judgment against the maker without reference to such security whether
the security is in the form of a pledge of collateral or a mortgage on real or
personal property.
Garza v. Allied Fin. Co., 566 S.W.2d 57, 62 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ)
(citing Maupin v. Chaney, 163 SW.2d 380 (Tex. 1942)); see also Middleton v. Nibling, 142
S.W. 968, 969 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1911, no writ) (stating that a mortgagee "may bring
suit on [the debt] and obtain judgment for the debt; and if no foreclosure is asked in such suit




Chapter 24 of the Texas Business & Commerce Code is the Texas version
of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. Essentially, the act is designed to
protect creditors against transfers made by a person or entity without receiv-
ing reasonably equivalent value when the indebted person or entity is insol-
vent, or as a result becomes insolvent. 29' Additionally, Section 548 of the
Bankruptcy Code allows a trustee in certain circumstances to avoid or set
aside transfers and obligations that are similarly fraudulent as to a bank-
ruptcy estate or its creditors. 292
1. Corporate Good Will: Transfers Between Corporations
Airflow Houston, Inc. v. Theriot 293 presents a somewhat unusual situation
because the bulk of the transferred assets essentially consisted of the intangi-
ble goodwill of two corporations. Generally, two related corporations exper-
ienced financial difficulties and failed to pay their franchise taxes. This
resulted in the termination of their certificates of authority to do business in
1988. The corporations were unable to pay their bank debt in the years
leading up to 1988, and the principals of the corporation agreed to liquidate
their assets to reduce related bank debt. Around the same time, however,
Theriot, an individual, loaned one of the corporations $100,000.00 in return
for a promissory note. During the liquidation process, a new corporation
was formed by or at the behest of one of the principals of the two insolvent
corporations. Although no tangible assets were transferred to this new cor-
poration, intangible assets such as the company logo, name, telephone
number, goodwill, and possibly the client list of the company were all trans-
ferred to the new corporation, which had been created without the knowl-
edge of Theriot. Additionally, the transfers also apparently occurred
without Theriot's knowledge.
The trial court, and the court of appeals in affirming, first disregarded the
separate corporation identities of the two original corporations (a parent and
its subsidiary) and the newly formed secret corporation. The appellate court
held that the evidence was sufficient to disregard the corporate identities. 294
291. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE § 24.001 (Vernon 1991).
292. See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988).
293. 849 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ).
294. "Whether or not to disregard the corporate fiction is a question of fact and common
sense." Id. at 931. Typically, the following factors may be considered in determining whether




(4) Payment by one corporation of wages of the other corporation's employees;
(5) Common business names;
(6) Services rendered by employees of corporation on behalf of the other
corporation;
(7) Undocumented transfers of funds between corporations; and
(8) Unclear allocation of profits and losses between corporations.
Id.; see also Superior Derrick Servs., Inc. v. Anderson, 831 S.W.2d 868, 864 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
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With respect to the allegedly fraudulent transfer, the critical issue was
whether a transfer of goodwill could be subject to the fraudulent transfer
statute. The court noted that goodwill is property subject to being sold or
otherwise transferred. Even though goodwill is intangible in nature, it is
nevertheless an integral part of the business, just like physical assets. 295 Ac-
cordingly, the court found that the transfer of good will constituted a trans-
fer of property under the Fraudulent Transfer Act.296 Finally, the damage
award against the secret corporation was not limited to the value of the good
will transferred. Rather, the damages against the new corporation were in
an amount equal to the entire indebtedness under Theriot's promissory
note. 2
97
2. Insolvency - Balance Sheet Test
In Pioneer Home Builders, Inc.29 8 the bankruptcy court applied the bal-
ance sheet test, found in both the Bankruptcy Code and the state statute, to a
series of foreclosures by and transfers to a major secured creditor of the
debtor. Under the balance sheet test, a corporation is deemed insolvent
when the sum of its debts exceeds the fair value of its assets.299 The court's
analysis focused on the meaning of the phrase "a fair valuation," which the
court found was the fair market price, based upon what price certain of the
assets would bring on the open market, without a deduction for costs and
expenses associated with the sale of the assets. 30° Applying the balance sheet
test, and based upon the court's interpretation of "a fair valuation," the
court found that the debtor was not insolvent at the time the transfers were
made. 301
That finding, however, did not conclude the resolution of whether the
transfers could be set aside. The court noted that both the Bankruptcy Code
and the state statute allow the avoidance of transfers "which financially crip-
ple a debtor and leave it with unreasonably small capital. ' 302 Neither stat-
ute, however, defines unreasonably small. The court examined the debtor's
ability to generate enough cash from operations and asset sales to pay debts
and remain financially stable. In Pioneer Home Builders the court noted that
the debtor was having such difficulties before the subject transfers that the
295. Theriot, 849 S.W.2d at 933.
296. Id. at 932-33. The court applied the 1967 version of the state's Fraudulent Transfer
Act. Id.
297. Id. at 933-34. The court based its award of damages on the language in the statute
allowing "any other relief the circumstances may require." Id. at 934.
298. 147 B.R. 889 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992).
299. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(32) (1988); see also TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.003(a),
which provides as follows: "(a) A debtor is insolvent if the sum of the debtor's debts is greater
than all of the debtor's assets at a fair valuation." TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 24.003(a)
(Vernon 1991).
300. Pioneer Home Builders, 147 B.R. at 891-92. "A fair valuation of a debtor's assets,
therefore, must concern itself with the price a debtor could obtain at open market, not the net
proceeds of the sale." Id. at 892.
301. Id. at 893.
302. Id. at 893-94 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.005 (Vernon 1991) and 11
U.S.C. § 548 (1988)).
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transfers did not significantly exacerbate the problem. The court applied the
state and federal statutes to require "that the disputed transfers cause the
unreasonably small capital condition. '30 3 Accordingly, based on the court's
finding that the debtor was not insolvent at the time of the transfer and that
the transfers may have aggravated, but did not cause, the debtor's unreason-
ably small capital, the disputed transfers did not constitute fraudulent trans-
fers subject to avoidance. 30 4
3. Federal Preemption of State Statute
In Sweet Jan Joint Venture v. FDIC30 5 borrowers filed suit against the
FDIC, as receiver of a failed savings and loan, based upon certain allegations
under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act in connection with the transfer
of notes as part of a purchase and assumption transaction. The court found,
however, that the state statute presented an obstacle to the accomplishment
of congressional objectives in connection with the FDIC and FSLIC's dispo-
sition of failed institutions.3 06 The court also dismissed a cause of action
based upon an alleged breach of the duty of a duty of good faith and fair
dealing on the part of one or more of the entities involved in the purchase
and assumption. 307
F. USURY AND OTHER COUNTERCLAIMS
Although usury is more thoroughly covered in the article on banking law
and elsewhere in this issue, it is not uncommon for borrowers to assert usury
as a counterclaim in response to attempts to collect or enforce an indebted-
ness. Accordingly, a number of usury-related cases are included in this sec-
tion of the article. Most of these cases center on usury, but as is the case in
the foreclosure section of the article, many of these cases include allegations
of DTPA violations, breach of a purported duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing, and other claims.
1. Overdraft Charges
In a decision with potentially far reaching implications, a Houston Court
of Appeals ruled that the honoring of an overdraft on a checking account is
a loan by the bank, and a charge assessed against the customer for this ser-
vice may constitute interest for purposes of the Texas usury law. In Tony's
Tortilla Factory, Inc. v. First Bank 308 the plaintiff maintained two checking
303. Id. at 894 (emphasis in original). The court also noted that although a debtor may be
unable to meet its financial obligations, this does not necessarily presuppose legal insolvency.
Id. at 894 n.7. But see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.003(b) (Vernon 1991) ("A] debtor
who is generally not able to pay the debtor's debts as they become due is presumed to be
insolvent.").
304. Pioneer Home Builders, 147 B.R. at 895.
305. 809 F. Supp. 1253 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
306. Id. at 1258.
307. Id. The court found that there was no evidence to support that the entities in question
had a special relationship of the type necessary for a plaintiff to prevail on such a claim. Id.
308. 857 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ granted).
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accounts in which it had overdrawn on checks ranging from $11.44 to
$5,170.00 over the course of less than a year. The bank assessed a service
charge of $20.00 for each overdraft. 30 9 The trial court granted an instructed
verdict in favor of the bank, and the customer (which was also a borrower of
the bank from time to time) appealed on the basis that whether and to what
extent the service charges were usurious constituted a question of fact for the
jury.
The court applied a step-by-step analysis to determine whether overdraft
payments were loans, whether the customer incurred an absolute obligation
to repay those overdrafts, and whether the overdraft fees were excess com-
pensation for the lending of money. 310 As a threshold inquiry, there must
have been an overcharge by a lender for the use, forbearance, or detention of
the lender's money. The essential elements of usury are: a loan of money; an
absolute obligation that the principal be repaid; and exacting a greater com-
pensation than allowed by law for the use of money by the borrower.31 The
court also noted that under the UCC, a bank may charge an otherwise prop-
erly payable item against a customer's account, even though that charge cre-
ates an overdraft. 312 The court also noted that the Texas Supreme Court has
stated, and numerous other jurisdictions hold, that when a bank voluntarily
pays a check as an overdraft, it makes a loan to its customer. 31 3
The court next inquired whether the bank expected the customer to repay
the bank for the overdrawn checks. Reviewing testimony in the trial court,
the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence presented that the cus-
tomer was expected to repay the bank for the overdrafts. Having addressed
that issue, the court then analyzed the usury implications of the $20.00 per
check service fee. As noted above, interest greater than that allowed by law
is usurious, 31 4 interest being defined as compensation allowed by law for the
use, forbearance, or detention of money. 315 The court held that a lender
may make certain extra charges for distinctly separate and additional con-
sideration other than the lending of money, in which event a court would
look beyond the form of the transaction to its substance to determine
whether the additional charges are usury. 316 After reviewing substantial tes-
timony regarding the imposition of the fee and the bank's internal character-
309. Id. at 586-87.
310. Id. at 584.
311. Id. at 584 (citing Holly v. Watts, 629 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1982)).
312. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.401 (Vernon 1968).
313. Tony's Tortilla Factory, 857 S.W.2d at 584; see Brian v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 628
S.W.2d 761, 763 n.2 (Tex. 1982); see also United States v. Christo, 614 F.2d 486, 493 (5th Cir.
1980) (holding that a bank may enforce overdraft just like any other loan); Sayen v. Riggs
Nat'l Bank, 544 A.2d 267, 269 (D.C. App. 1988). Numerous other cases are cited in the
Tony's Tortilla Factory opinion. See Tony's Tortilla Factory, 857 S.W.2d at 584-85.
314. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.01(d) (Vernon 1987).
315. Id. at art. 5069-1.01(a). If there is no specified rate of interest agreed by the parties,
then the rate is six percent (6%) per annum. Id. at art. 5069.-1.03.
316. Tony's Tortilla Factory, 857 S.W.2d at 586 (citing Texas Commerce Bank v. Goldring,
665 S.W.2d 103, 104 (Tex. 1984)); Gonzales Say. Ass'n v. Freeman, 534 S.W.2d 903, 906 (Tex.
1976). Whether such a fee or charge is interest or a service charge is a question of fact for the
jury. Id. at 104.
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ization of those fees, the court determined that enough evidence existed to go
to the jury on whether there was an absolute obligation that principal be
repaid and whether the service charges constituted interest on a loan. 317
Although this precise question could arise in any banking context, its pos-
sible implications are obvious, and as a practical matter, the situation would
likely arise in the context of a financially troubled borrower asserting a coun-
terclaim or an affirmative claim in response to a debt collection effort. In
Tony's Tortilla Factory, for instance, that litigation arose in the form of a
wrongful foreclosure suit. 318
2. Guaranty of Third Party's Debts - Alamo Lumber Co.
In Moore v. Liddell, Sapp, et al.319 Moore and his son were jointly and
severally liable on a promissory note (the Carlson Park note). Moore had
also guaranteed other indebtedness incurred by his son and sued his credi-
tor's law firm alleging usury in making demand and filing suit on both debts.
The court addressed Moore's usury allegations on the assumption that
Moore's third party guarantee was required as a condition for the extension
of funds on the note on which he was directly liable. Moore relied on the
holding in Alamo Lumber Co. v. Gold 320 to support his allegation that the
amounts guaranteed on his son's notes constituted additional interest on the
Carlson Park note. In Alamo Lumber Co. the Texas Supreme Court held
that if payment or assumption of another's existing debt is required as a
condition of the extension of credit, then the amount of the debt paid or
assumed is treated as additional interest for usury calculations E.32  In Moore,
however, Moore was only required to guarantee subsequent loans to his son,
which contrasted with Alamo Lumber Co., in which actual payment or di-
rect assumption of the debt was the triggering event. 322 In Moore the court
reasoned that the liability of a guarantor is a contingent, secondary obliga-
tion in nature, liability for which is expressly contingent on the original
maker's default. Therefore, the court held that Moore's guarantee of his
son's indebtedness was not usury.323
3. Failure to Credit Principal
Kentor v. Karotkin324 involved another claim against a creditor's lawyers.
Two lawyers, on separate occasions, made demand on Kentor for amounts
that included both the full accelerated principal balance and a number of
past due installments. The letters failed to take into account the fact that
317. Tony's Tortilla Factory, 857 S.W.2d at 586-87.
318. Id. at 582-584.
319. 850 S.W.2d 291 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ denied).
320. 661 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. 1983).
321. Id. at 928.
322. Moore, 850 S.W.2d at 293-94 (citing Bank of El Paso v. T.O. Stanley Boot Co., 809
S.W.2d 279, 290 (Tex. App.-E! Paso 1991), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 847
S.W.2d 218 (Tex. 1992)).
323. Id. at 294.
324. 852 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ denied).
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payment of the past due installments would necessarily result in a reduction
of the principal amount also contained in the letter. In other words, princi-
pal was overcharged. Both lawyers admitted that the overcharge contained
in their letters resulted from their "negligence and carelessness. '325 This
admitted negligence and carelessness did not constitute accidental and bona
fide error which is generally characterized as a clerical error resulting from
unintentional mishaps in office practice or routine.326 Kentor claimed that
to the extent there was an overcharge or a failure to credit principal, that
overcharge constituted a charge for the use, forbearance, or detention of
money, and therefore constituted usury. The trial court found, however,
and the court of appeals affirmed, that an overcharge of principal is just that
- an overcharge of principal. The appellate court found that Kentor's reli-
ance on an earlier case the court had decided was misplaced, instead relying
on the same court's recent finding in a more recent case also addressing a
failure to credit principal.3 27 That earlier case found that neither the failure
to credit a large principal payment nor the resulting interest charge were
usurious.
3 2 8
4. Usury Savings Clause
In Bernie's Custom Coach v. Small Business Administration329 the Fifth
Circuit, applying Texas law, addressed a claim that language contained in a
promissory note constituted an illegal contract for the right to charge usuri-
ous interest. 3 30 The claims focused on the note's acceleration clause, which
allowed for acceleration of the entire "indebtedness," which was defined as
all principal interest, whether now due or "hereafter to become due."' 331
The borrower claimed that based upon this definition, the note on its face
allowed the lender to declare due unearned interest.
The promissory note in question, however, contained a usury savings
clause to the effect that notwithstanding anything contained in the note, the
interest in the note would never exceed the maximum rate allowed by law.
Usury savings clauses have been routinely recognized as valid and enforcea-
ble to defeat claims of usury, and courts generally presume that the parties
intended a non-usurious contract. 332 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held
325. Id. at 265 n.8.
326. See Esparza v. Nolan Wells Communications, Inc., 653 S.W.2d 532, 536 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1983, no writ).
327. Kentor, 852 S.W.2d at 266. See McPherson Enters., Inc. v. Producers Coop. Mktg.
Ass'n., Inc., 827 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ denied). Kentor relied upon the
court's finding in Hardwick v. Austin Gallery of Oriental Rugs, Inc., 779 S.W.2d 438 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1989, writ denied); however, that case involved an overcharge of money that
was not contemplated by the parties to the original contract, and the facts otherwise were
dissimilar to those in Kentor.
328. Kentor, 852 S.W.2d at 267 (citing McPherson, 827 S.W.2d at 96).
329. 987 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1993).
330. The mere "contracting for" usurious interest may be a violation of the usury statutes,
even though no interest is actually charged or collected. Id. at 1197 (citing Ashley v. Edwards,
626 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ)).
331. Bernie's Custom Coach, 987 F.2d at 1197.
332. Id. at 1197-98. See, e.g., FDIC v. Claycomb, 945 F.2d 853, 860 (5th Cir. 1991), cert.
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that the note was not usurious. This finding obviated the need to address
whether the note was otherwise usurious. 333
5. Pre-Payment Penalties
In Affiliated Capital v. Commercial Federal Bank 3 3 4 the lender first noti-
fied a borrower of a possible foreclosure following default in two monthly
payments. In response, the borrower requested prepayment information.
The lender responded that the note did not allow prepayment prior to a
certain date, and the lender refused to waive note provisions to that effect.
Later, the bank accelerated the note demanding payments for the balance
due and the prepayment penalty. The borrower asserted that the prepay-
ment penalty was usurious, the theory being that had the accelerated debt
been paid following the acceleration, the entire prepayment penalty would
have amounted to an astronomical charge of interest in a very short period
of time. The court refused to characterize the prepayment penalty as a
charge for unearned interest. 335 Rather, the court found that the prepay-
ment penalty was more in the nature of mitigation of the lender's loss of the
originally contracted interest.3 36 As such, the penalty would be susceptible
to the application of the spreading doctrine and the usury savings clause
found in the note.337
The borrower asserted three other claims, all relating to the no-prepay-
ment and acceleration clauses contained in the note. Those claims were
based on breach of contract, breach of duty of good faith, and the Deceptive
Trade Practices Act. Before addressing those claims, the court found that
the note was not ambiguous.
With respect to the various causes of action asserted by the borrower, the
bank found that the lender's refusal to allow prepayment did not constitute a
breach of contract, moving next to the allegations of a breach of duty of
good faith. The court noted the general rule that there can be no breach of a
duty of good faith merely by a party's acting in strict accordance with a
contract's terms.3 38 The court did not address whether and to what extent a
debtor/creditor relationship can otherwise give rise to a duty of good faith
and fair dealing. Numerous cases have held, however, that there is no such
duty on the part of a lender absent other circumstances, 339 nor is such a duty
denied, 112 S. Ct. 2301 (1992) ("The court must, if reasonably possible, give effect to the
savings clause and interpret the savings clause as to deny the right to usurious interest.");
Smart v. Tower Land & Inv. Co., 597 S.W.2d 333, 341 (Tex. 1980) ("[I]t will be presumed that
the parties intended a non-usurious contract."); Myles v. Resolution Trust Corp., 787 S.W.2d
616, 618 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, no writ) ("Texas has repeatedly given effect to usury
savings clauses to defeat a construction of a contract that would violate state usury laws.").
333. Bernie's Custom Coach, 987 F.2d at 1199.
334. 834 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, no writ).
335. Id. at 525-26.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 527; see English v. Fisher, 660 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex. 1983).
339. See, e.g., FDIC v. Coleman, 795 S.W.2d 706, 708-09 (Tex. 1990); Baskin v. Mortgage
and Trust, Inc., 837 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied);
McDonald v. Foster Mortgage Corp., 834 S.W.2d 573, 576 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
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presumed in typical contractual relationships. 340
Finally, the borrower asserted that the bank violated the DTPA in numer-
ous respects. As was the case with the good faith claims, the court held that
enforcing rights provided by contract is not a violation of the DTPA. 34t
Moving to the more basic problem of asserting DTPA violations against a
lender, the court found that the borrower did not contract to buy property,
materials, or anything else from the bank. Rather, the borrower contracted
to borrow money using certain real estate as collateral. Thus, the court
found no DTPA violations, even assuming the bank's actions were "oppres-
sive" as alleged by the borrower.3 42 Thus, the court affirmed the trial court's
summary judgment in favor of the bank. 343
In a more recent opinion of the Dallas Court of Appeals, the court ad-
dressed the question of a no prepayment clause in a real estate lien note.
Groseclose v. Rum34 4 did not arise in a debt collection context, but it is nev-
ertheless instructive of the issues of prepayment penalties and spreading in a
usury context. The borrowers sought declaratory relief to the effect that a
no-prepayment clause in a real estate lien note violated the Texas statute that
prohibits prepayment charges or penalties when residential mortgage loans
exceed a specified rate of interest. 345 The court held that the statutory prohi-
bition applies only if the note's interest rate is greater than the twelve per-
cent per annum referenced in the statute because, under Texas law, the
general rule is that unless the loan agreement provides otherwise, and absent
other statutory prohibition, a borrower does not have the right to prepay a
loan.346 Therefore, according to the court, a no prepayment clause cannot in
and of itself be interpreted as a penalty, because it merely states the rights of
the parties. 34 7 The court then applied the spreading test to allocate the pre-
1992, writ denied); Lovell v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 298, 302 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 1988, writ denied).
340. C. Pineda v. P.M.I. Mortgage Ins. Co., 843 S.W.2d 660, 670 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1992), writ denied per curiam, 851 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. 1993); Central Say. & Loan Ass'n
v. Stemmons N.W., 848 S.W.2d 232, 243 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ). But see TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.203 (Vernon 1968) (holding that contracts falling within UCC
impose obligation of good faith in performance of enforcement).
341. Affiliated Capital, 834 S.W.2d at 528; see also Ogden v. Dickinson State Bank, 662
S.W.2d 330, 333 (Tex. 1983) (no violation of DTPA when bank forecloses for partial default,
as provided in contract).
342. Id. One whose only relationship with a lending institution is that of a borrower is not
a consumer under the D.T.P.A. See First State Bank v. McMordie, 861 S.W.2d 284, 285-86
(Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, n.w.h.); Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 603 S.W.2d 169, 173-75
(Tex. 1980).
343. Affiliated Capital, 834 S.W.2d at 529.
344. 860 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, n.w.h.).
345. Art. 5069-1.07(f) states that prepayment charges or penalties cannot be collected
when interest rates exceed certain amounts:
if a loan for property that is to be the residential homestead of the borrower is
made at an interest rate that is greater than the rate prescribed by subsection (d)
of this article, a prepayment charge or penalty may not be collected on the loan
unless the charge or penalty is required by an agency created by federal law.
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.07(f) (Vernon 1987). Subsection (d) provides for an
interest rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum. Groseclose, 860 S.W.2d at 556.




payment penalty across the life of the loan to determine whether the loan
exceeded the statutory rate of interest. Based upon testimony in the trial
court, the court found that there was a material fact issue, so it reversed a
summary judgment in favor of the borrower.348
6. Federal Holder in Due Course
In RTC v. Ammons3 49 a trial court's summary judgment that apparently
held a note void and unenforceable because the creditor demanded and
charged usurious interest on a promissory note was reversed. During the
course of the trial court litigation, the original plaintiff savings and loan was
declared insolvent, and the RTC became the institution's receiver. After the
RTC became a substituted party, it asserted D'Oench Duhme and its federal
holder in due course status as an absolute defense against the borrower's
usury claims. The appellate court agreed, holding that at a minimum, the
RTC raised a fact issue with respect to its holder in due course status, pre-
sumably whether it acquired the note in good faith and without actual
knowledge of any defenses. 350 Additionally, the court held that because the
alleged usury occurred in a summary judgment motion and supporting affi-
davit, it represented a pleading, and based on recent Texas authority, that
did not constitute usury.35'
III. CONSUMER CREDIT
A. FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT
There was little, if any, development in the Fifth Circuit or the Texas
courts under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 352 Clomon v. Jack-
son 353 may be the only circuit level authority under the Act during the Sur-
vey period. Even though it arises out of the Second Circuit, it is suggested
reading as an example of the manner in which a lawyer can be found to have
violated the Act, which prohibits the use of any false, deceptive, or mislead-
ing practice in an attempt to collect certain consumer debts. 354 The Clomon
348. Id. at 557-58.
349. 836 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1992, no writ.)
350. Id. at 710. Texas case law acknowledges that there has developed a federal, common
law holder in due course status conferred upon receivers of financial institutions, even when
those receivers do not meet the requirements of state law to be a holder in due course. Id.; see
also NCNB Texas Nat'l Bank v. Campisi, 788 S.W.2d 115, 118 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist] 1990, writ denied). The effect of being a holder in due course is that personal defenses,
such as failure of consideration and usury typically may not be asserted against a holder in due
course who has acquired a note in good faith and without actual knowledge of those defenses.
Ammons, 836 S.W.2d at 709 n.5.
351. Id. at 710; see George A. Fuller Co. v. Carpet Servs., 823 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. 1992). A
charge of interest must be more than a pleading filed with the court. "Usury statutes are
designed to correct abusive practices in consumer and commercial credit transactions, not to
serve as a trap for the unwary pleader in a court proceeding." Ammons, 836 S.W.2d at 710-11
(citing Murray v. O&A Express, Inc., 630 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. 1982)).
352. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (1988).
353. 988 F.2d 1314 (2d Cir. 1993).
354. The test used by the Second Circuit is an objective standard based on the "least so-
phisticated consumer standard." Id. at 1318.
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court found that the use of a mass produced collection letter bearing a fac-
simile signature of a lawyer, who had not personally reviewed the matters
referenced in the letter, amounted to a violation of the Act. 355
B. TEXAS DEBT COLLECTION ACT
In Rey v. Acosta, 35 6 a case discussed above, 357 the court held that wrong-
ful acceleration of a note secured by real property violates the Texas Debt
Collection Practices Act and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act as a matter
of law. 358 In Rey the creditor failed to provide the notice of intent to accel-
erate as required by the Texas Property Code in the context of the indebted-
ness secured by a debtor's residence, so acceleration without that notice was
premature. The court held that this violated the Texas Debt Collection
Practices Act, which specifically prohibits any debt collector from "threaten-
ing to take any action prohibited by law."' 359 Moreover, when the creditor
claimed that the note had been accelerated, this amounted to a representa-
tion that the creditor had the right to terminate a contract, when in fact that
right had not yet ripened. According to Rey, this violated the Deceptive
Trade Practices Act as a matter of law. 36°
355. Id. at 1322-23. The language used in the letters was sufficient to cause the least so-
phisticated consumer to believe that the lawyer had reviewed and considered individual files,
which was misleading. Id. at 1320-21.
356. 860 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, n.w.h.).
357. See supra notes 277-84.
358. Rey, 860 S.W.2d. at 659.
359. Id.; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1102(h) (Vernon 1987).
360. Rey, 860 S.W.2d at 659; see also Dixon v. Brooks, 604 S.W.2d 330, 334 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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